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Within their respective boundaries, the states own the navigable waters
and soils under them for the common use of the public.' When the lands
abutting navigable waters are privately owned, public access to and use of
state-owned waters and submerged lands may become difficult or
impossible. As more and more riparian landowners2 have exercised their
right to exclude the public from their private waterfront properties, state and
local governments have implemented various measures to enhance public
access to and use of government-owned tidelands, streambeds, and lake
shores. 3 Although not necessarily titled as such, many of these measures
result, without payment of compensation, in an easement allowing public
access to and use of private waterfront property.
Section I begins with a description of the rights of riparian property
owners and the right of the public to use government-owned shores and
tidelands, followed by a general overview of various state legislative and
judicial responses designed to address the conflicts that arise when these
competing interests collide. The authors then focus on the legislative and
judicial developments in two geographically and culturally distinct
jurisdictions. Section II discusses the laws of Florida. Section III is a
discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Stop the Beach
1. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845); Martin v. Waddell's Lessee,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842); see discussion infra Part I.B.
2. Although in its general use "riparian" may refer to land abutting any body of water, in its
more technical use "riparian" refers to land abutting a river or stream and "littoral" refers to land
abutting an ocean, sea or lake. Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assocs.,
512 So.2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1987). In this article, we use the term "riparian" in its general sense to refer to
land abutting any body of water.
3. For example, Hawaii's statutory access to beaches and shores below the "upper reaches of
the wash of the waves," HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 115-4, 115-5 (2010), supplements that state's Na Ala Hele
program, which utilizes ancient, pre-western contact trails that lie principally along the shorelines, Id
§ 264-1.
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Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection.4
Section IV provides an analysis of the laws of Montana, which strongly
protect the public's right to recreate on all waters located within its
boundaries, and the effect of those laws on private property rights. Section
V addresses the creative public access laws of Hawaii and Texas. In Section
VI, the authors conclude with an assessment of the impact of the Stop the
Beach Renourishment case on state efforts to provide access to government-
owned waters, tidelands, and shores.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Property Rights and the Right to Exclude
Throughout its history, the United States has fostered and encouraged
private ownership of real property.5 With some notable exceptions, 6 private
property interests (including the rights of riparian property owners) are
created and defined by state law.' Although the U.S. Constitution does not
create property interests, it protects them.' For example, the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the taking of private property
for public use without payment of just compensation. 9
Property is "the sum of all the rights and powers incident to
ownership."'o The "bundle of rights" commonly associated with the
ownership of real property includes the right of the owner to transfer the
4. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't Envtl. Prot., 177 L. Ed. 2d 184 (2010).
5. Richard Norejko, From Metes and Bounds to Grids or a Cliff Notes History of Land
Ownership in the United States, FAIR & EQUITABLE, Jan. 2009, at 3, available at
http://www.iaao.org/uploads/Norejko.pdf Approximately sixty percent of lands located within the
United States are privately owned; federal, tribal, state, and local governments own the remaining forty
percent. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., MAJOR USES OF LAND IN THE UNITED STATES 35
(2002), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/EIB14/eibl4j.pdf
6. For example, property interests in copyrights and patents are defined and created by federal
law. HARRY G. HENN,, HENN ON COPYRIGHT LAW 2-3 (1991).
7. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 177 L. Ed. 2d at 192.
8. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
9. The Fifth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago B
& 0 R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 106 U.S. 226, 239 (1898). Most state constitutions also prohibit the
taking of private property without just compensation. Eg., FLA. CONST. art X, § 6; MONT. CONST. art.
2, § 29.
10. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 268 (1933).
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property, to possess and use the property, and to exclude others from the
property." This article focuses in particular upon the right to exclude.
The U.S. Supreme Court has characterized the right to exclude as one
of the most "essential sticks"12  and "treasured strands"13 of property
ownership, and a "fundamental element" that "the Government cannot take
without compensation."' 4 Courts have steadfastly protected the right of
property owners to exclude others from their land, without inquiring into
whether the exercise of this right serves a rational, beneficial, or public
purpose, and without engaging in a balancing of the interests of the
property owner vis-a-vis the interests of those being excluded."
In a series of cases before the U.S. Supreme Court, private property
owners enjoyed success in defending their "right to exclude" against
uncompensated government imposition of "easements of passage" that
allowed public access across private property to facilitate the public's use of
government-owned waters, beaches, and waterfronts.' 6 In Kaiser Aetna v.
United States,'7 the Supreme Court ruled that the government's attempt to
create a public right of access across a private pond through the imposition
of a navigational servitude was a taking of private property that required
compensation under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Supreme Court noted that a
taking would occur if "individuals are given a permanent and continuous
11. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164. 176 (1979); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (describing property rights as "the right to possess,
use, and dispose of [a thing]" (quoting United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945))).
This list of rights is not exclusive. Generally, rights associated with the ownership of property are a
matter of state law. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 177 L. Ed. 2d at 192. For example, in Florida
riparian owners also have the right of access to water, the right to an unobstructed view of the water, and
the right to receive accretions. Id The seminal riparian rights decision in Florida is Hayes v. Bowman,
91 So.2d 795 (Fla. 1957), which describes the principal three riparian rights as access to the navigable
channel, wharfage and piers. Obviously, there is no private right of wharfage along the Gulf of Mexico
or Atlantic Ocean in the manner common to interior riparian parcels.
12. Kaiser, 444 U.S. at 176.
13. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
14. Kaiser,444 U.S. at 179-80.
15. The right to exclude is enforced through the tort of trespass, for which a remedy lies as
long as the entrance onto the land of another was intentional. For example, intentionally setting a foot
upon land owned by another gives rise to a trespass action, even if the trespasser mistakenly believes
that he is on his own property. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 164 (1964).
16. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987); Kaiser, 444 U.S. at 179-80.
17. Kaiser, 444 U.S. at 180.
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right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may continuously be
traversed."'
In view of these precedents, states must carefully consider and protect
the right of riparian property owners to exclude others when designing
measures intended to provide public access to and use of government-
owned tidelands and shores.
B. Sovereign Ownership ofLands
Submerged Under Navigable Waters
Under English common law, the crown owned the shores abutting and
soils underlying all "navigable waters" located within its jurisdiction.' 9 In
England, there were few, if any, navigable rivers that extended above the
reach of the tide, and thus English common law recognized as "navigable
waters" only those waters affected by the ebb and flow of the tide.20 The
crown's title (jus privatum) to the navigable waters and their shores and
soils was subject to the use of the public (fus publicum):
Such waters, and the lands which they cover, either at all
times, or at least when the tide is in, are incapable of
ordinary and private occupation, cultivation and
improvement; and their natural and primary uses are public
in their nature, for highways of navigation and commerce,
domestic and foreign, and for the purpose of fishing by all
the King's subjects. Therefore the title, jus privatum, in
such lands, as of waste and unoccupied lands, belongs to
the King as the sovereign; and the dominion thereof, jus
publicum, is vested in him as the representative of the
nation and for the public benefit .... That the people have
a public interest, a jus publicum, of passage and repassage
18. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 832. The Court characterized a government-imposed easement as a
"permanent physical occupation" in violation of the rule set forth in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982). Id. However, imposition of an easement across private property
may be allowed in the context of an exaction if certain conditions are met. Id. at 853. But see Dolan, 512
U.S. at 391 (noting that an imposition of an easement across private property may be allowed in the
context of an exaction if certain conditions are met).
19. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1892). In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court was
called upon to determine ownership of land in Astoria, Oregon, located below the high water mark of
the mouth of the Columbia River. Id. at 1. The Court undertook a thorough analysis of the laws
governing the ownership of shores and tidelands, including the English common law and the laws of the
thirteen original states. Id. at 11-58.
20. Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 454-55 (1851).
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with their goods by water, and must not be obstructed by
nuisances. 2'
The crown's title to the shores abutting navigable waters commenced at
the ordinary high water mark.22 A grant from the sovereign of land bounded
by the ocean or other navigable tidal waters did not convey any title to soils
below the high water mark, unless a contrary intent was clearly indicated by
the language of the grant or long usage under it. 23 With regard to soils lying
under rivers that were not navigable (including all rivers not affected by the
ebb and flow of the tide), the riparian property owner held title to the
middle of the streambed. 24
At the conclusion of the American Revolution, the people of the
thirteen original states "became themselves sovereign" and acquired the
rights previously held by the crown of England, including "the absolute
right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them for their own
common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the
Constitution to the general government."25 Unlike England, many rivers
within the original thirteen colonies were navigable far above the reach of
the tide. Recognizing the importance of retaining ownership of the
streambeds underlying these rivers to protect the free flow of commerce
and transportation, most of the original thirteen states expanded the
meaning of "navigable waters" for purposes of title26 to include those
waters beyond the reach of the tide, if those waters were actually
21. Shively, 152 U.S. at10-12.
22. Attorney-General v. Chambers, (1859) 45 Eng. Rep. 1, 29; 4 De G. M & G. 206 (citations
omitted). In determining the ordinary high water mark, the Court concluded that the highest spring tides
and lowest neap tides should not be considered. Id. at 29.
23. Shively, 152 U.S. at 13.
24. Id. at 31.
25. Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842). An exception applies to
submerged lands that had previously been granted by the crown or another prior sovereign to private
parties. But see S.F. City & County v. Le Roy, 138 U.S. 656, 671 (1891) (noting that an exception
applies to submerged lands that had previously been granted by the crown or another prior sovereign to
private parties). Additionally, the original thirteen states obtained a navigational servitude over tidally
influenced waters, which was subject to a superior navigational servitude in favor of the federal
government. See generally United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 423 ("The
State and [private riparian landowners] alike. . . hold the navigable waters and the lands under them
subject to the power of Congress to control the waters for the purpose of commerce.").
26. The meaning of "navigable waters" for purposes other than title may vary. For example,
"navigable waters" is much more broadly defined for purposes of whether the United States has
jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S.
715, 730-31 (2006).
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navigable.27 However, some of the original thirteen states adhered to the
English common law, limiting state ownership to the shores and soils of
only those navigable waters affected by the ebb and flow of the tide. 28Under
the equal footing doctrine, states admitted to the Union after the original
thirteen also acquired ownership of the lands underlying the waters located
within their boundaries that were navigable at the time of statehood.29 In
determining what waters are navigable for purposes of state ownership
under the equal footing doctrine, the courts apply the federal common law
test for navigability, enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court as follows:
The rule long since approved by this court in applying the
Constitution and laws of the United States is that streams or
lakes which are navigable in fact must be regarded as
navigable in law; that they are navigable in fact when they
are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their natural
and ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over
which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the
customary modes of trade and travel on water; and further
that navigability does not depend on the particular mode in
which such use is or may be had-whether by steamboats,
sailing vessels or flatboats-nor on an absence of
occasional difficulties in navigation, but on the fact, if it be
27. See, e.g., McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa 1, 55-57 (1856) (noting that the private owner
was driven back from the middle of the stream); Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9, 21 (1849) (noting that
the test for public servitude was whether a stream was capable of being used for the purposes of
commerce or for the floating vessels, boats, rafts, or logs); Moore v. Sanborne, 2 Mich. 519, 519-20
(1853) (noting that rivers were subject to the servitude of public interest if they had the capacity for
valuable floatage); Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475, 484-85 (Penn. 1810) (noting that the "flux and reflux"
of the tides does not determine navigability, and soil under a navigable river belongs to the state). For
purposes of admiralty jurisdiction, federal law also adheres to the "navigable in fact" test, which is
satisfied if the waters "are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for
commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and
travel on water." The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 557 (1871).
28. Van Ruymbeke v. Patapsco Indus. Park, 276 A.2d 61, 65 (Md. 1971); Brosnan v. Gage, 133
N.E. 622, 624 (Mass. 1921); Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N.J.L. 369, 380-81 (Sup. Ct. 1867). Although the
shores and submerged lands of navigable waters not affected by the tide are owned by the riparian
owners, the public reserves certain rights over such waters, including the right to use the waters for
navigation and fishing. For example, in Brosnan v. Gage, 133 N.E. at 624, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court noted that although the riparian owned the soils of a river beyond the reach of the tide, such
ownership was subject to "an easement or right of passage up and down the stream in boats or other
craft for purposes of business, convenience or pleasure."
29. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845).
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a fact, that the stream in its natural and ordinary condition
affords a channel for useful commerce.30
In order to satisfy the navigability test for purposes of the equal footing
doctrine, it is not necessary that a particular river was actually being used
for commerce at the time of statehood. An absence of actual use, especially
in sparsely settled areas, can be overcome upon presentation of sufficient
evidence of the river's "susceptibility to use as a highway of commerce" at
the time of statehood. 3 1
With regard to nonnavigable streams and rivers, the states have
generally followed the English common law, recognizing that title of the
riparian landowner extends to the middle of the channel of the river. States
have taken a more divergent approach to ownership of the soils underlying
non-navigable lakes. Although several jurisdictions have adopted the
principle that the riparian owner takes to the center of the bed of a non-
navigable lake, 33 other jurisdictions have limited private ownership to a
point at or near the water's edge. 34
C. Boundaries Between Riparian Lands
and State-Owned Submerged Lands
1. General Principles
When privately owned property abuts navigable waters, the
determination of the boundary between them is important, because it
30. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 76 (1931) (citing United States v. Holt State Bank, 270
U.S. 49, 56 (1962)).
31. Id. at 82.
32. See, e.g., Bullock v. Wilson, 2 Port. 436, 448 (Ala. 1835) (noting that "the owner of land
bounded by a fresh water river, owned the land to the centre of the channel of the river, as by common
right"); Foss v. Johnstone, 110 P. 294, 298 (Cal. 1910) (stating that where a land owner borders
nonnavigable waters they "take[] to the middle of the ... stream"); Arnold v. Munby, 6 N.J.L. 1, 10-13
(Sup. Ct. 1821) (noting that a "grant of land, bounded upon a freshwater stream or river" extends to the
center of that river); Wyckoff v. Mayfield, 280 P. 340, 341 (Or. 1929) ("It is the settled law of this state
that a line running to the bank of a stream, or to the stream which is nonnavigable, extends to the center
or thread of the stream.").
33. Warren v. Chambers, 25 Ark. 120, 122 (1867); Smith v. City of Rochester, 92 N.Y 463
(1883); Lembeck v. Nye, 24 N.E. 686, 689 (Ohio 1890).
34. See Fuller v. Shedd, 44 N.E. 286, 286 (Ill. 1896) (noting that a landowners' rights ended at
the lake's meandered shoreline as depicted upon the government survey); State v. Gilmanton, 9 N.H.
461, 463 (1838) ("[I]n relation to grants bounding on ponds, lakes, or other large bodies of standing
fresh water ... the grant extends only to the water's edge."); see also infra notes 87-89 and
accompanying text.
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demarcates the line between state-owned lands that the public is generally
entitled to use and private lands over which the landowner is entitled to
exercise his right to exclude the public. For example, if a member of the
public is strolling down the state-owned "wet sands" of a beach and steps
across the boundary line onto adjacent privately-owned "dry sands," she
may be subject to a civil or criminal trespass claim.
The rules governing water boundaries are complex for several reasons.
The laws establishing the boundaries between navigable waters and
adjacent riparian lands vary from state to state, and on occasion federal law
applies.35 Furthermore, the rules may vary within each jurisdiction as
between different types of water bodies, such as tidelands, marshes, rivers,
and lakes. Differing rules often apply to navigable versus non-navigable
waters and natural versus artificial water bodies. And yet, another set of
rules may apply to "swamp and overflowed" lands granted by the federal
government to the various states. 36
Unlike land boundaries, water boundaries are usually ambulatory. The
waters of rivers are constantly changing their course, ocean shores are
reshaped by the flux of the tides, and lakefronts change with variations in
water levels. A "gradual and imperceptible" change caused by the deposit or
removal of soil is referred to as an "accretion" or a "reliction." 37 As a
general rule, the riparian landowner is entitled to accretions and relictions,
resulting in a boundary that moves with the water.38 A sudden or perceptible
35. See, e.g., Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 291 (1967) (applying federal law, instead of
state law, to determine who owned artificially-created accretions along the Pacific coast).
36. See Act of March 2, 1849, ch. 87, 9 Stat. 352 (aiding the state of Louisiana in draining the
swamp lands therein); Swamp Land Act of 1850, 43 U.S.C. § 982 (2006) (enabling most states to
construct necessary levees and drains and to reclaim certain swamplands). For a discussion of swamp
and overflowed lands, see BRUCE S. FLUSHMAN, WATER BOUNDARIES: DEMYSTIFYING LAND
BOUNDARIES ADJACENT TO TIDAL OR NAVIGABLE WATERS 17-22 (Roy Minnick ed., 2002) and Sidney
F. Ansbacher & Joe Knetsch, Negotiating the Maze: Tracing Historical Title Claims in Spanish Land
Grants and Swamp and Overflowed Lands Act, 17 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 351 (2002).
37. An accretion results in the gradual addition of sand, sediment or other deposits to
waterfront property, whereas relictions result in the gradual exposure of formerly submerged lands as a
result of the gradual recession of water. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.,
177 L. Ed. 2d 184, 192-93 (2010). Both "accretion" and "reliction" are subsequently referred to as
accretions in this article.
38. Hughes, 389 U.S. at 293-94 ("Any other rule would leave riparian owners continually in
danger of losing the access to water which is often the most valuable feature of their property, and
continually vulnerable to harassing litigation challenging the location of the original water lines."). The
common law rule of accretion has been codified in many states. E.g., Mont. Code Ann. § 70-18-201
(2009). While the Florida Supreme Court held in Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274, 287-88 (Fla. 1972), that
Florida took title to relictions as Lake Okeechobee was drained to attempt to facilitate development of
the Everglades, that court later stated, in Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key
Assocs., 512 So.2d 934, 939-40 (Fla. 1987), that Martin addressed a dispute over whose survey was
2010] 51
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change, such as the creation of a new channel in a river as the result of a
flood or the destruction of a beach as a result of a hurricane, is referred to as
an "avulsion." Unlike accretions, an avulsion generally does not result in an
adjustment of the boundary to the water's edge; instead, the boundary
remains the same as before the avulsion.39 Several jurisdictions also
distinguish between, and apply different rules to, accretions and avulsions
that arise naturally versus those caused artificially.40
Perhaps one of the greatest challenges relating to water boundaries is in
translating the legal boundary (such as the "high water mark") into an
actual physical location, especially when the boundary is constantly
changing. 4' Furthermore, the precise boundary is seldom visible to or
ascertainable by members of the public who are using adjacent, state-owned
lands.
2. Application of State Law
Under English common law, the high water mark established the
boundary between sovereign soils underlying navigable waters and the
adjacent riparian property.42 The original thirteen states succeeded to the
rights of the crown in the submerged lands of navigable waters below the
high water mark, and under the equal footing doctrine, subsequent states
acquired similar rights.43 However, the development of the parameters of
the exact rights of riparian property owners became a matter of state law,44
with some important limitations. First, the title of states in the soils of
accurate, and that any discussion of reliction was nonbinding dicta. While the Florida Supreme Court in
Stop the Beach Renourishment did not even cite Martin, Justice Scalia's opinion for the United States
Supreme Court held Martin was binding Florida authority. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 177 L.
Ed. 2d at 207.
39. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 177 L. Ed. 2d at 193; Missouri v. Nebraska, 196 U.S.
23, 35 (1904).
40. See, e.g., Sand Key, 512 So.2d at 937, 941 (noting that naturally formed accretions vest in
the owner, but holding that artificially formed accretions will only vest if they result from work done by
a third party).
41. See 1 AARON V SHALOWITZ, Chapter 6: The Tidal Boundary Problem, in SHORE AND SEA
Boundaries 89-90 (1962), available at
http://www.nauticalcharts.noaa.gov/hsd/docs/CSE_1ibraryshalowitz vlplch6.pdf (discussing the
technical aspects of determining the location of tideland boundaries).
42. Attorney-General v. Chambers, (1859) 45 Eng. Rep. 1, 23; 4 De G. M & G. 206. For all
non-navigable rivers, the riparian owners held title to the middle of the stream, also referred to as the
filum aquae. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 31 (1892).
43. See supra Part I.B.
44. In Shively, 152 U.S. at 57-58, the Court noted that "[t]he title and rights of riparian or
littoral proprietors in the soil below high water mark, therefore, are governed by the laws of the several
States."
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navigable waters is subject to the right to regulate interstate commerce
granted to the federal government under the U.S. Constitution,45 which
includes the power to keep all interstate navigable waters "open and free
from any obstruction to their navigation, interposed by the States or
otherwise [and] to remove such obstructions when they exist."46 This has
become known as the federal navigational servitude, 47 and any state grant of
property below the high water mark is subject to this servitude.
As a second limitation, states were required to recognize property rights
created by a prior sovereign. For example, if the English sovereign had
previously conveyed submerged soils of navigable waters below the high
water mark to a private party, the state did not acquire ownership of those
previously ceded soils. 48
Subject to these limitations, it is the prerogative of each individual state
to determine the extent of the property rights granted to riparian property
owners below the high water mark, including the establishment of the
boundary between riparian property and state-owned, submerged lands.49
All lawyers facing riparian property legal issues should take heed of the
following warning:
[T]here is no universal and uniform law upon the subject;
but that each State has dealt with the lands under the tide
waters within its borders according to its own views of
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. 713, 724-25 (1866)
("Commerce includes navigation. The power to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that
purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all the navigable waters of the United States which are
accessible from a State other than those in which they lie. For this purpose they are the public property
of the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation by Congress.").
46. Gilman, 70 U.S. at 725; see also Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 163 (1900)
("[W]hether the title to the submerged lands of navigable waters is in the State or in the riparian owners,
it was acquired subject to the rights which the public have in the navigation of such waters.").
47. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967) ("This power to regulate navigation
confers upon the United States a 'dominant servitude,' which extends to the entire stream and the stream
bed below ordinary high-water mark." (citation omitted)).
48. See Shively, 152 U.S. at 58 ("Grants by Congress of portions of the public lands within a
Territory to settlers thereon, though bordering on or bounded by navigable waters, convey, of their own
force, no title or right below high water mark, and do not impair the title and dominion of the future
State when created; but leave the question of the use of the shores by the owners of uplands to the
sovereign control of each State, subject only to the rights vested by the Constitution in the United
States."); S.F. City & County v. Le Roy, 138 U.S. 656, 671 (1891) (explaining that grants by the federal
government of territorial lands have generally been construed to convey title to the high water mark).
49. St. Louis v. Rutz, 138 U.S. 226, 242 (1891) ("The question as to whether the fee of the
plaintiff, as a riparian proprietor on the Mississippi river [sic], extends to the middle thread of the
stream, or only to the water's edge, is a question in regard to a rule of property, which is governed by the
local law .... ).
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justice and policy, reserving its own control over such
lands, or granting rights therein to individuals or
corporations, whether owners of the adjoining upland or
not, as it considered for the best interests of the public.
Great caution, therefore, is necessary in applying
precedents in one State to cases arising in another. 0
It is beyond the scope of this article to summarize the laws adopted by
each state affecting riparian ownership. Not only do the laws vary among
jurisdictions, but within a single jurisdiction, different laws may apply to
different water bodies or for different purposes. Furthermore, each
jurisdiction has developed its own "bundle of rights" incidental to riparian
ownership, such as the right to access the water, the right to build wharfs
and other structures, and the right to a view. Although not a comprehensive
review, the following comments briefly discuss the prevailing choices made
by states in defining riparian rights.
3. Boundaries on Ocean Coasts
On ocean coasts, the states acquired ownership of the tidelands (the
lands covered and uncovered by the daily ebb and flow of the tide). 5
Ownership of the submerged lands lying three miles seaward of the coast
was ceded by the federal government to the states under the 1953
Submerged Lands Act.52
50. Shively, 152 U.S. at 26.
51. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 381-82 (1891) ("This right of the States to regulate and
control the shores of tide-waters, and the land under them, is the same as that which is exercised by the
Crown in England.").
52. In 1947, the Supreme Court issued a decree that the United States was "possessed of
paramount rights in, and full dominion and power over, the lands, minerals and other things" underlying
the sea to the extent of three nautical miles measured from the low-water mark on the coast or from the
outer limit of internal waters, and that the coastal states had "no title thereto or property interest
therein." United States v. California, 332 U.S. 804, 805 (1947). Subsequently, Congress enacted the
Submerged Lands Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-31, 67 Stat. 29 (1953) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-
1315 (2006)), ceding to the coastal states all the property rights of the United States in submerged lands
within three miles of the baseline (and up to three marine leagues in the Gulf of Mexico if a state
established a historic title to such broader area). 67 Stat. at 30 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1312).
The Submerged Lands Act gave the states "the right and power to manage, administer, lease, develop,
and use" the submerged land and natural resources of the ceded area. Id § 6, 67 Stat. at 32 (codified at
43 U.S.C. § 1311(a)). The United States retained, however, "powers of regulation and control of said
lands and navigable waters for the constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense,
and international affairs." Id. § 6, 67 Stat. at 32. (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a)).
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Derived from English common law,53 the boundary between state-
owned tidelands and adjacent upland riparian property is generally the high
water mark.54 In 1935, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed at length the
appropriate definition of the "high water mark" for boundary purposes,
concluding that it is determined by "the average height of all the high
waters at that place" over a period of 18.6 years, and not solely by reference
to the highest spring tides or the lowest neap tides. 5 Subsequent to that
decision, most states have adopted a substantially similar definition of the
high water mark in establishing the boundary separating riparian properties
from tidelands. 56
To encourage private construction of wharfs and other improvements,
several states, primarily in the northeast, have granted ownership of
tidelands to the low water mark. 7 In these jurisdictions, riparian ownership
of the lands lying between the low and high water marks may be subject to
certain uses by the public, such as navigation and fishing.5 1
4. Boundaries on Navigable Rivers
Under English common law, the boundary between navigable rivers
and adjacent riparian lands is the high water mark.59 Whereas only a
handful of states have departed from the high water mark as the boundary
of tidelands, there has been much greater disparity amongst the states in
deciding the appropriate boundary between riparian lands and navigable
rivers.
53. Attorney-General v. Chambers, (1859) 45 Eng. Rep. 1, 23; 4 De G. M & G. 206.
54. United States v. Pacheco, 69 U.S. (2 Wall) 587, 590 (1865). But, consistent with Oregon ex
rel State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 378-80 (1987), a state may obtain
the sovereign lands underlying tidal lands after achieving statehood. Accordingly, Florida's constitution
limits sovereign title in tidal lands to those underlying submerged lands water-ward of the mean high
water line. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11 (1970). The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal explicated this
limitation in Lee v. Williams, 711 So.2d 57, 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998), that sovereign lands under the
Florida Constitution underlie "navigable waters."
55. Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 26-27 (1935). For a discussion of the
boundary in estuaries, tidal marshes and tidal rivers and deltas, see FLUSHMAN, supra note 36, at 141-
231.
56. Florida did so in Miller v. Bay-to-Gulf Inc., 193 So. 425, 428 (Fla. 1940). Florida has since
codified the mean high water line as the average high tide over a tidal epoch of nineteen years. FLA.
STAT. § 1277.27(14) (2010).
57. Boston v. Richardson, 105 Mass. 351 (Mass. 1870); Bell v. Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 173 (Me.
1989) (citing State v. Wilson, 42 Me. 9, 28 (1856)).
58. Bell, 557 A.2d at 169-70 (noting that privately owned tidelands are subject to an easement
allowing public use of the tidelands for fishing, fowling and navigation).
59. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1894).
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As the law began to develop, several early judicial decisions vaguely
described riparian ownership as extending "to the water's edge," or referred
to state ownership of the "banks" or "shores" of a river.60 As more and more
waterfront property was developed and its value increased, state legislatures
and courts were required to be more specific. Many states, through judicial
decision6 or by statute, 62 extended the title of riparian owners to the low
water mark of navigable streams. One of the reasons for adopting the low
water mark was to protect the right of the riparian owner to river access.
Other states, adhering to the English common law, limited riparian
ownership to the high water mark. 63 A small number of states have extended
the title of riparian owners to the middle of navigable rivers. 64
Whereas a relatively uniform interpretation of "high water mark" has
been adopted amongst the states as it applies to tideland boundaries, 65 many
courts have noted the difficulty in determining the high water mark of a
river. In an early decision involving the boundary between Alabama and
Georgia on the Chattahoochee River, three divergent opinions were issued.
In his dissent, Justice Nelson had this to say about high water marks on
rivers:
[I]n respect to freshwater rivers, the term is altogether
indefinite, and the line marked uncertain. It has no fixed
meaning in the sense of high-water mark when applied to a
river where the tide ebbs and flows, and should never be
adopted as a boundary in the case of freshwater rivers, by
60. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845) ("The shores of navigable
waters, and the soils under them, were not granted by the Constitution to the United States, but were
reserved to the States respectively."); Hahn v. Dawson, 134 Mo. 581, 591 (1896) (explaining that a
riparian owner owns "to the water's edge").
61. See Barre v. Fleming, 1 S.E. 731, 738-39 (W. Va. 1887) (concluding that "the title of the
riparian owner of land bounded by the Ohio river extends, at least, to low water mark, subject to the
public easement of navigation"); see also State ex rel. Citizen's Electric Lighting & Power Co. v.
Longfellow, 69 S.W. 374, 379 (Mo. 1902) (noting that a State, by judicial decision, can extend the title
of riparian owners to the low water mark of navigable streams).
62. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-201 (2010); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 830 (West 2010).
63. McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa 1, 53-54, 57 (1856); Hinman v. Warren, 6 Or. 408, 412
(1877).
64. Houck v. Yates, 82 Ill. 179, 181 (1876); Muench v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 53 N.W. 2d 514,
517 (Wis. 1952) (noting that title is "qualified" by the right of the public to use the river for navigation).
Some states that originally recognized title of a navigable river to the middle of the stream subsequently
changed their laws. For example, although Georgia originally recognized ownership to the middle of a
stream, in 1863 Georgia enacted legislation limiting title of riparian owners on navigable streams to the
low-water mark, applicable to state grants of land after 1863. Fla. Gravel Co. v. Capital City Sand &
Co., 154 S.E. 255, 257 (Ga. 1930).
65. Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 26-27 (1935).
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intendment or construction, whether between States or
individuals. It may mean any stage of the water above its
ordinary height, and the line will fluctuate with every
varying freshet or flood that may happen.66
Justice Wayne, writing for the majority, stated that the boundary was
intended to be the waters at "their highest flow," and that determining such
boundary "requires no scientific exploration to find or mark it out. The eye
traces it in going either up or down a river, in any stage of water." 67 In his
concurring opinion, Justice Curtis noted that "neither the line of ordinary
high-water mark, nor of ordinary low-water mark, nor of a middle stage of
water, can be assumed as the line dividing the bed from the banks." Instead,
this line:
is to be found by examining the bed and banks, and
ascertaining where the presence and action of water are so
common and usual, and so long continued in all ordinary
years, as to mark upon the soil of the bed a character
distinct from that of the banks, in respect to vegetation, as
well as in respect to the nature of the soil itself. Whether
this line between the bed and the banks will be found above
or below, or at a middle stage of water, must depend upon
the character of the stream.68
In developing a definition for high water mark that translates to a
physical location, many states have relied upon the vegetation line as the
sole or an important factor:
Whatever difficulty there may be in determining [the high
water mark] in places, this doubtless may be said: What the
river does not occupy long enough to wrest from
vegetation, so far as to destroy its value for agriculture, is
not river bed.69
Another approach is to look for a natural line of impression left by the
water, such as "the point on the bank or shore up to which the presence and
66. Howard v. Ingersoll, 54 U.S. 381, 424 (1852) (Nelson, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 415-16.
68. Id. at 427 (Curtis, J., concurring).
69. Houghton v. C., D. & M. R. Co., 47 Iowa 370, 374 (1877). The Iowa Supreme Court
rejected "the ordinary rises" of the river that occurred in the spring as well as the line that the river
impresses upon the soil. Id. at 373-74.
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action of the water is so continuous as to leave a distinct mark either by
erosion, destruction of terrestrial vegetation, or other easily recognized
characteristic." 0 Other courts have accepted evidence of water stage and
elevation data.7
As with the high water mark, courts have struggled to define the low
water mark of navigable rivers with precision.72 Some courts have held that
the low water mark is "the point to which the river recedes at its lowest
stage."7 3 Other courts have determined that the appropriate definition is the
ordinary low water mark unaffected by floods or drought. 74
5. Boundaries on Nonnavigable Rivers
States have consistently adhered to the English common law, extending
ownership of riparian land abutting nonnavigable rivers to the middle of the
stream.75
6. Boundaries on Lakes
English common law provided little guidance with regard to lakes; the
issue of sovereign ownership of lakes was not fully addressed by the
English courts until 1878.76 This dearth of English common law, coupled
with the diversity in the size and uses of lakes scattered throughout the
70. Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 820 (Wis. 1914).
71. United States v. Cameron, 466 F. Supp. 1099, 1101 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (defining high water
mark for purposes of the federal navigational servitude).
72. Union Sand & Gravel Co. v. Northcott, 135 S.E. 589, 593 (W. Va. 1926) ("[I]t is quite true
that the line of low water mark could not be fixed for all time with absolute certainty, because at no two
periods of the year could the line be delineated on the ground with absolute precision.").
73. Id. at 592.
74. Stover v. Jack, 60 Pa. 339, 343 (1869) ("[A]ny other rule than ordinary low-water mark
unaffected by drought as the limit of title would carry the rights of riparian owners far beyond
boundaries consistent with the interests and policy of the state . . . ." (emphasis omitted)).
75. See, e.g., Bullock v. Wilson, 2 Port. 436, 448 (Ala. 1835) (noting that "the owner of land
bounded by a fresh water river, owned the land to the centre of the channel of the river, as by common
right"); Foss v. Johnstone, 110 P. 294, 298 (Cal. 1910) (stating that where a land owner borders non-
navigable waters they "take[] to the middle of the ... stream"); Arnold v. Munby, 6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1821)
(noting that a "grant of land, bounded upon a freshwater stream or river" extends to the center of that
river); Wyckoff v. Mayfield, 280 P. 340, 341 (Or. 1929) ("It is the settled law of this state that a line
running to the bank of a stream, or to the stream which is nonnavigable, extends to the center or thread
of the stream.").
76. Bristow v. Cormican, [1878] 3 A.C. 641 (H.L.) 641-42 (appeal taken from Ireland)
(holding that the crown had no rights of ownership in the shores or beds of a lake beyond the reach of
the tide).
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United States, has led to the adoption of varying rules amongst the states
governing ownership of lake shores and beds.
Some states apply a different test to lakes versus other bodies of water
in determining whether lakes are navigable or non-navigable for purposes
of title. For example, whereas Massachusetts abided by the English law
tidal test to determine navigability of rivers, it has applied a different rule to
"great ponds," "the enjoyment of which for fishing and fowling and other
uses was common to all, and the title in which and the lands under them
was not the subject of private property, unless by special grant from the
legislature."" Rather than focusing exclusively on a lake's use as a highway
of commerce for trade and transport, several states have considered other
public purposes in determining whether lakes should be classified as
navigable, including whether "the fisheries of the lake are of such a
character that they should be exercised in common by the public"78 and
whether the lake is used by noncommercial boats "for pleasure." 79
Several courts and scholars have questioned the advisability of applying
the concepts of high water mark and low water mark, which arose in the
context of tidal waters, in establishing lake boundaries. In dissenting to the
adoption of the ordinary high water mark as the landward boundary of
public trust lands on the Great Lakes, Justice Markham of the Michigan
Supreme Court observed:
[On the Great Lakes there are] no "high" or "low" water
marks, as they are scientifically understood. Instead, lake
levels are affected seasonally by the natural operation of
the hydrologic cycle, which includes precipitation,
evaporation, condensation, and transpiration. During the
winter . . . more water leaves the lake than enters it ...
resulting in a decline in lake levels. As snow begins to melt
in the early spring, runoff into the lakes increases. Further,
as temperatures increase, the warm, moist air above the
relatively cold lakes limits evaporation to an amount less
than the rate of condensation. As a result, average water
levels rise throughout the spring and eventually peak
during midsummer.80
77. Paine v. Woods, 108 Mass. 160, 169 (1871).
78. Flisrand v. Madson, 152 N.W. 796, 799 (S.D. 1915).
79. Lamprey v. State, 53 N.W 1139, 1139 (Minn. 1893).
80. Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 98-99 (Mich. 2005) (Markman, J., concurring in part
and dissenting).
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Nonetheless, most states have established the boundary between state-
owned lake shores and beds and adjacent riparian property as either the
high water mark" or the low water mark.82 The meander line of a lake as
depicted on government surveys is not the boundary.83
In spite of the fact that the hydrological and geological characteristics
of lakes and rivers are markedly different, most states have applied the
same test to both bodies of water in determining the physical boundary of
the high or low water mark. For example, the Michigan Supreme Court
imported the definition for the high water mark of a lake from Wisconsin,
which arose in the context of a river boundary dispute:
[The ordinary high water mark is] the point on the bank or
shore up to which the presence and action of the water is so
continuous as to leave a distinct mark either by erosion,
destruction of terrestrial vegetation, or other easily
recognized characteristic. And where the bank or shore at
any particular place is of such a character that is impossible
or difficult to ascertain where the point of ordinary high-
water mark is, recourse may be had to other places on the
bank or shore of the same stream or lake to determine
whether a given stage of water is above or below ordinary
high-water mark.84
As applied to lakes, courts have adopted various definitions of the low
water mark, including "the line or level at which the waters of a lake
usually stand when free from disturbing causes"85 and "the low level
reached by the waters of a lake under ordinary conditions unaffected by
periods of extreme and continuous drought."86
81. Gasman v. Wilcox, 35 P.2d 265, 266 (Idaho 1934); Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274, 278-87
(Fla. 1972).
82. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-201 (2009); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 830 (West 2010).
83. See Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 380 (1891) (discussing that the meander lines are for
bounding and abutting and the real boundary is the water); In re Ownership of Bed of Devils Lake, 423
N.W.2d 141, 143 (N.D. 1988) ("[A] water line, rather than a meander line, ordinarily forms the
boundary of a tract of land abutting a navigable body of water.").
84. Glass v. Goeckel, 58 N.W.2d at 72 (citing Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 NW. 816,
820 (Wis. 1914)). See generally FLUSHMAN, supra note 36, at 295-307 (discussing the rule from Diana
Shooting Club in the context of other high water mark tests); Frank E. Maloney, The Ordinary High-
Water Mark: Attempts at Settling an Unsettled Boundary Line, 13 LAND & WATER L. REV. 465, 467-68
(1978) (discussing how a high water mark is determined).
85. Slauson v. Goodrich Transp. Co., 94 Wis. 642, 645 (1897).
86. South Dakota Wildlife Fed'n v. Water Mgmt. Bd., 382 N.W.2d 26, 27 (S.D. 1986). See
generally FLUSHMAN, supra note 36, at 307-11 (discussing this language in the context of other low
water mark tests).
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There is divergence amongst states as to the appropriate boundary for
non-navigable lakes. As with non-navigable rivers, several states extend
riparian title of the beds of non-navigable lakes to the middle of the lake. 7
However, several states limit ownership to the water's edge." One court
justified the application of a different rule to lakes as follows:
Non-navigable streams are usually narrow, and the lines of
riparian owners can be extended into them at right angles,
without interference or confusion, and without serious
injustice to any one. It was therefore natural, when such
streams were called for as boundaries, to hold that the real
line between opposite shore owners was the thread of the
current .... But when this rule is attempted to be applied
to lakes and ponds practical difficulties are encountered.
They have no current, and, being more or less circular, it
would hardly be possible to run the boundary lines beyond
the water's edge, so as to define the rights of shore owners
in the beds .... It would be unfair and unjust to allow a
party to claim and hold against his grantor the bed of a lake
containing thousands of acres, solely on the ground that he
had bought and paid for the small surrounding fractional
tracts-the mere rim.89
D. The Public Trust Doctrine
The public trust doctrine originated in Roman law. The Institutes of
Justinian stated that "the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the
shores of the sea" are "common to all mankind." 90 These were public
property, or res communes. While the English doctrine of the public trust
was first codified in the Magna Carta, Saxon and Norman societies
87. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-201 (2009); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 830 (West 2010).
88. Trs. of Sch. v. Schroll, 12 N.E. 243, 245 (Ill. 1887). In Fuller v. Shedd, 44 N.E. 286, 295
(Ill. 1896), the Illinois Supreme Court noted that:
If we depart from the reasonable rule we have established, the small non-
navigable lakes would become the private waters of riparian owners, pertinent to
their lands, with exclusive rights thereon as to boating, fishing and the like, from
which the body of the people would be excluded-a principle inconsistent with
and not suited to the condition of our people or called for as a rule of law.
89. Indiana v. Milk, 11 F. 389, 395 (C.C.D. Ind. 1882).
90. ROBERT W FREUDENBERG, GOING DOWN TO THE SHORE: ENHANCING COASTAL PUBLIC
ACCESS ALONG NEW JERSEY'S SHORELINES 1 (2005), available at
http://www.csc.noaa.gov/cz/CZO5_Proceedings/pdP20files/posters/Freudenberg.pdf
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determined that the crown held rights over wildlife and fishing resources. 9'
The Norman conquest established William the Conqueror's dominion over
all lands in England.92 The Magna Carta established the Crown's general
ownership over the realm, subject to a public trust over all lands lying
seaward of the high tide mark, or tidelands.
The public trust doctrine "obligates a state government to act as trustee
of the public interest in all public lands and waters in that state." 93 Professor
Joseph Sax stated what might be the broadest definition of the doctrine. He
opined that the United States conveyed lands to the various states subject to
the public trust, so all subsequent grantees are obligated to use those lands
in the public interest.94 Professor Sax did not believe that the public trust
obligation was immutable, stating that, "[N]o grant may be made to a
private party if that grant is of such amplitude that the state will effectively
have given up its authority to govern, but a grant is not illegal solely
because it diminishes in some degree the quantum of traditional public
use." 95 The distinction between "total abdication" versus "diminishment" of
government authority is the key. Even Sax notes the conflict between public
rights and private benefits.
The U.S. Supreme Court first applied public trust principles in Martin
v. Waddell's Lessee.96 The Court cited the Magna Carta in holding that the
public trust doctrine barred a conveyance of private oyster harvesting
originating under a royal grant. It noted British Crown grants prohibited the
crown from imparting public rights in tidelands "when the title is held by a
single individual in trust for the whole nation."97 The State of New Jersey
held the lands as well in the public trust, and private proprietors could not
impede the public use of the tidelands.
The U.S. Supreme Court's seminal decision on the public trust doctrine
is Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, in which it determined title to
91. See, e.g., Jane Bell, The Boundaries of Property Rights in English Common Law, in
REPORT TO THE XVIITH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 11 (2006).
92. Justice J. Bryson, Henry II and the English Common Law; Lecture to the Plantagenet
Society of Australia (July 20, 2002).
93. Sidney F. Ansbacher & Joe Knetsch, The Public Trust Doctrine and Submerged Lands in
Florida: A Legal and Historical Analysis, 4 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 337, 346 (1989).
94. Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Laws: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 476-89 (1970).
95. Id. at 488-89.
96. Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 411 (1842). Several state decisions had
previously applied public trust principles. See, e.g., Browne v. Kennedy, 5 H. & J. 195 (Md. 1821)
(applying public trust principles); Arnold v. Munby, 6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1821) (applying public trust
principles).
97. Waddell Lessee,41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 411.
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reclaimed lands and adjoining submerged lands along the Chicago
waterfront. 98 The state legislature first granted substantial submerged lands
in the harbor to the railroad, but then repealed the act authorizing the
conveyance. 99 The Court held that the state may convey sovereign lands
only where the conveyance is not contrary to the public interest. The
attempted grant of a substantial portion of a major harbor violated the
state's public trust obligation. As Sax, then Ansbacher and Knetsch noted,
the core holding established the central tenet of the public trust doctrine:
When a state holds a resource which is available for the
free use of the general public, a court will look with
considerable skepticism upon any governmental conduct
which is calculated either to reallocate that resource to
more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-
interest of private parties.'
The public trust doctrine has continued to develop under state law. Not
surprisingly, the public trust doctrine has developed differently among the
various states.101
II. FLORIDA
Since 1970, the Florida Constitution has provided that the State holds
title in the public trust to lands waterward of the mean high water line along
the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico. 02 Private upland ownership is
bounded, constitutionally, by an ambulatory mean high water line.
Florida's Supreme Court held in Broward v. Mabry that littoral rights of
access, wharfage, and view appurtenant to ownership at the high water line
"are property rights that may be regulated by law, but may not be taken
98. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 443-76 (1892).
99. Id. at 449-50.
100. Ansbacher & Knetsch, supra note 93, at 347 (citing Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 490 (1970)).
101. See generally Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to Western States' Public Trust
Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37
ECOLOGY L.Q. 53 (2010) (discussing the public trust doctrine trends of western states); Robin Kundis
Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property
Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2007) (discussing the various public trust
doctrines of thirty-one eastern states).
102. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11 (1970); see Ansbacher & Knetsch, supra note 93 (explaining that
Florida Constitutional, statutory and common law establish title boundaries in that state along tidally
influenced waters at the mean nineteen-year value).
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without just compensation and due process of law."' 03 In State v. Florida
National Properties, Inc. , the Florida Supreme Court confirmed that the
high water line is a transient boundary, and that an attempt to fix
permanently that boundary by statute was unconstitutional.' 04 At least, that
was so until Stop the Beach Renourishment altered the rule dramatically.
A. Background Principles of State Law Regarding
Riparian and Littoral Rights
One must analyze Florida law in determining two fundamental points.
First, what constitutes a property right under Florida law? Second, when
has a state action so deprived property rights as to require compensation?
Florida law has long held that riparian or littoral rights are appurtenant to
ownership along navigable waters. Additionally, deprivation of any of those
rights has long been held to be compensable.
Article I, Section 2 of the Florida Constitution provides: "Basic rights -
All natural persons . ... have inalienable rights, among which are the right
to acquire, possess and protect property ... ." The Florida Supreme Court
noted in Shriners Hospital v. Zrillic that property rights are "woven into the
fabric of Florida history" and stem from organic law, citing to common law,
the Declaration of Rights in Florida's original Constitution and the current
State Constitution.' 5 In significant part, the Shriners Court stated: "[T]he
phrase 'acquire, possess and protect property' in article I, section 2,
includes the incidents of property ownership: the '[c]ollection of rights to
use and enjoy property . . . .'"106
The Shriners court emphasized that real property rights are "inalienable
rights grounded in natural law . . ." and are protected by Article I, section
2 of the Florida Constitution as well as the U.S. Constitution.' 7 Shriners
concluded that reasonable property regulation may require compensation.08
Florida long held that lands abutting navigable waters carry appurtenant
riparian or littoral rights. 09 This is consistent with U.S. Supreme Court
authority. In Pollard Lessee v. Hagan, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
103. Broward v. Mabry, 50 So. 826, 830 (Fla. 1909).
104. State v. Fla. Nat'l Props., Inc., 338 So. 2d 13, 13 (Fla. 1976).




109. See, e.g, Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So.2d 795, 802 (Fla. 1957) (ruling that a parcel that fronted
the navigable Boca Ciega Bay carried rights of wharfage into, access to, and view of the navigable water
body).
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the equal footing doctrine fixed boundaries of sovereign title to lands
underlying tidal waters as of the date of admission to the statehood." 0
Florida entered the Union on March 3, 1845.1 In Oregon ex rel. State Land
Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., the U.S. Supreme Court held that a
state is free to retain title to certain sovereign beds, but may convey other
sovereign beds to private grantees or otherwise constrict the definition of
sovereign lands after it achieves statehood:
Once equal footing doctrine had vested title to the riverbed
in [the state] as of the time of its admission to the Union,
the force of that doctrine was spent; it did not operate after
that date to determine what effect on titles the movement of
the river might have." 2
In sum, each state's law governs how and whether sovereign lands are
altered." 3
Stop the Beach Renourishment addressed titles along a tidally
influenced water, the Gulf of Mexico. Roman jurists held that the sea and
foreshore were res communes.114 The dominant English common law rule
held that the high water mark was the boundary between sovereign and
upland ownership." 5
Under the equal footing doctrine, Florida held sovereign title
underlying all tidally influenced waters upon statehood.116
Consistent with Corvallis, Florida altered boundaries along tidally
influenced waters by common law to limit tidal lands owned by the
sovereign to those lands under navigable waters."' The 1968 Florida
110. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845).
111. Theresa Bixier Proctor, Erosion of Riparian Rights Along Florida Coast, 20 J. LAND USE
117 (2004), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/landuse/vol20_1/proctor.pdf
112. Or. ex rel State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 371 (1987).
113. See Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876) (holding that a state may convey sovereign
lands to private grantees); see also Apalachicola Land & Dev. Co. v. McRae, 98 So. 505, 517 (Fla.
1923) (noting that "it is settled law in [Florida] that private ownership of lands bordering on navigable
waters extends only to high-water mark").
114. W. BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 184, 186 (1921).
115. Attorney-General v. Chambers, (1859) 45 Eng. Rep. 1, 23; 4 De G. M & G. 206; Dean
Everett Fraser, Title to the Soil Under Public Waters-A Question of Fact, 2 MINN. L. REV. 313, 318-21
(1918).
116. See generally Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 484-85 (1988)
(confirming that each state received title to all lands underlying tidally influenced waters upon statehood
and holding that each state may alter sovereign lands thereafter).
117. See, e.g., Clement v. Watson, 58 So. 25, 26 (Fla. 1912) (rejecting the "ebb and flow" test,
in restricting sovereign lands to those under navigable waters); State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 13
So. 643-44 (Fla. 1893) (discussing the title to the area under navigable waters).
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Constitution was amended in 1970 to codify that boundary. The Florida
Constitution delineates the boundary between uplands and submerged
sovereign lands as follows:
The title to lands under navigable waters, within the
boundaries of the state, which have not been alienated,
including beaches below mean high water lines, is held by
the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for all the
people."'
That section remains today.
The U.S. Supreme Court established the mean high water line (MHWL)
as the boundary for tidelands in Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. City of Los
Angeles." 9 The Borax court considered the common law ordinary high
water mark, which had been defined as the line of the medium high tide,
and held that the scientifically determined MHWL was the modern
equivalent of that common law rule.' 20 The MHWL as considered in Borax
is the average high tide over an 18.6-year lunar "epoch."' 2'
Florida's Supreme Court first considered the MHWL definition in
Miller v. Bay-to-Gulf Inc.'22 The Florida Court attempted to define the
"ordinary high tide line" as "the limit reached by the daily ebb and flow of
the tide."123
In 1974, Florida enacted Chapter 177, Part II of the Florida statutes,
entitled the "Coastal Mapping Act."124 The amorphous definition of high
tide line in Miller was clarified by Florida statute subsections 177.27(14)
and (15):
177.27 Definitions -- The following words, phrases, or
terms used herein, unless the context otherwise indicates,
shall have the following meanings:
(14) "Mean High Water" means the average height of the
high waters over a 19-year period. For shorter periods of
118. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11 (1970).
119. Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 26-27 (1935).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Miller v. Bay-to-Gulf, Inc., 193 So. 425, 428 (Fla. 1940).
123. Id.
124. 1974 Fla. Laws 61 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 177.25 to 177.40 (2000)).
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observation, "mean high water" means the average height
of the high waters after corrections are applied to eliminate
known variations and to reduce the result to the equivalent
of a mean 19-year value.
(15) "Mean High-Water Line" means the intersection of the
tidal plane of mean high water with the shore.12 5
In short, Florida's definition of MHWL since passage of Chapter 177,
Part II, parallels Borax.'2 6 Florida has long acknowledged that riparian or
littoral rights are appurtenances to lands on navigable waters; those rights
cannot be taken without compensation:
In so far as the declaration alleges the right of ingress and
egress to and from the lot over the waters of the bay, it
states a common law right appertaining to riparian
proprietorship. The common law riparian proprietor enjoys
this right, and that of unobstructed view over the waters,
and in common with the public the right of navigating
bathing, and fishing.127
Webb noted that then Florida Statutes section 192.61 [and now section
253.141] "may be accepted as a partial codification of the common law on
the subject." 128
Florida's seminal riparian case was Hayes v. Bowman.129 The Florida
Supreme Court explicated those rights further in Game & Freshwater Fish
Commission v. Lake Islands, Ltd.,130 where the court held that a rule barring
motorboats on a navigable lake was constitutional in general, but struck it
down as applied to riparian owners along the lake:
For the riparian right of ingress and egress to mean
anything, it must at the very least establish a protectable
interest when there is a special injury. To hold otherwise
125. Coastal Mapping Act, FLA. STAT. ch. 177.27, §§ 14-15, pt. 11(1974).
126. See Lee v. Williams, 711 So.2d 57, 62-63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that sovereign
lands under FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11 are "lands under navigable waters").
127. Webb v. Giddens, 82 So.2d 743, 745 (Fla. 1955) (quoting Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A. Ry. Co.,
78 So. 491, 501 (Fla. 1917)).
128. Id. But see Feller v. Eau Gallie Yacht Basin, 397 So.2d 1155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)
(noting that riparian rights stem from constitution and common law, and are not dependent on statute).
129. Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So.2d 795, 799-800 (Fla. 1957).
130. Game & Freshwater Fish Comm'n v. Lake Islands, 407 So.2d 189 (Fla. 1981).
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means the state could absolutely deny reasonable access to
an island property owner or block off both ends of a
channel without being responsible to the riparian owner for
any compensation. A waterway is often the street or public
way; when one denies its use to a property owner, one
denies him access to his property . . . . Reasonable access
must, of course, be balanced with the public good, but a
substantial diminution or total denial of reasonable access
to the property owner is a compensable deprivation of a
property interest.131
Maloney noted that "the term mean high water line appears in Article
X, Section 11 of the Florida Constitution [and in several statutes].,132
Maloney emphasized: "The Florida Coastal Mapping Act of 1974 is
especially significant in this regard."13 3 Recall that the statutory definition
partially codifies Webb v. Giddens.134 Maloney emphasized:
In that Act it is expressly declared that the Florida
Legislature "recognizes the desirability of confirmation of
the mean high-water line, as recognized in the State
Constitution and defined in Section 177.27(15) as the
boundary between state sovereignty land and uplands
subject to private ownership."135
Maloney listed the following cases that cited the above-noted definition
by 1980: Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v. Wetstone;136 City of
Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc. ;137 St. Jude Harbors, Inc. v. Keegan;138
Florida Board of Trustees of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Wakulla
131. Id. at 193.
132. FRANK E. MALONEY ET AL., FLORIDA WATER LAw 724-25 (1980), available at
http://www.ce.ufl.edu/~wrrc/docs/reports/50_florida water law.pdf
133. Id. at 725.
134. Webb v. Giddens, 82 So.2d 743, 745 (Fla. 1955).
135. MALONEY ET AL., supra note 132, at 725 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 177.26 (1979)).
Additionally, Florida Statutes section 177.28, as enacted in 1974, states in pertinent part:
177.28 Legal Significance of the mean high-water-line.--
(1) The mean high-water line along the shores of land immediately bordering on
navigable waters is recognized and declared to be the boundary between the
foreshore owned by the state in its sovereign capacity and upland subject to
private ownership.
136. Trs. of Internal Improvement Fund v. Wetstone, 222 So.2d 10, 15 (Fla. 1969).
137. City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So.2d 73, 78 (Fla. 1974).
138. St. Jude Harbors, Inc. v. Keegan, 295 So.2d 141, 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
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Silver Springs Co.;139 and St. Joseph Land & Development Co. v. Florida
State Board of Trustees of Internal Improvement Trust Fund.'40 Maloney
concluded:
These recent decisions and the statutory provisions
mentioned above indicated that the mean high water line is
now well-established as the legal boundary, between
private uplands and the state owned submerged lands in
tidal waters of the state.'4 '
Maloney explained that "[m]any of the boundary and title problems
which beset lands bordering waters are caused by changing shorelines."142
Maloney noted that high water lines are ambulatory by definition,
consistent with Borax.143 Maloney explained the general rule regarding
"accretion," or "gradual, imperceptible additions of soil to the shores ...
Florida follows the common law rule which vests title to soil formed by
accretion along navigable waters in the owners of abutting lands."144
Maloney distinguished man-made additions to uplands, which do not
generally alter waterfront boundaries in Florida.145 Maloney noted a salient
exception that stems from the Supreme Court decision in County of St.
Clair v. Lovingston:146 "Generally, where the [upland littoral owner]
claimant had no part in the erection of an obstruction causing accretion, the
fact that the accretion was initiated or otherwise influenced by an artificial
process will not impair his claim of title to the land thereby formed."147
Maloney cited the only then-extant Florida case on-point, Trustees of
the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Medeira Beach Nominee.148 The
State sought to enjoin the littoral land owner from constructing a seawall on
accreted lands that resulted from a public project. The court refused,
holding implicitly in pertinent part that vesting of accreted lands in the state
139. Fla. Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Wakulla Silver Springs Co., 362
So.2d 706, 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
140. St. Joseph Land & Dev. Co. v. Fla. State Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement Trust Fund,
365 So.2d 1084, 1087 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
141. MALONEY ETAL., supra note 132, at 725 (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 726.
143. Id. at 720-22.
144. Id. at 727.
145. Id. at 729-30.
146. Cnty. of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. 46, 63 (1874).
147. MALONEY ET AL., supra note 132, at 730.
148. Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Medeira Beach Nominee, 272 So.2d 209,
209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
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as a result of a public works project would constitute a taking.'4 9 This
decision addressed Florida Statutes section 166.051, "which purports to
vest title to accretions caused by public works."150
The Florida Supreme Court agreed with Medeira in Board of Trustees
of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Associates, Ltd.'5' The
Court held that upland waterfront owners, who did not participate in
improvements that resulted in accretion, were entitled to that accretion.152
As in Medeira, the Court held that Florida Statutes section 166.051 did not
vest title in the state against such an innocent landowner merely because of
the perceived public benefit of the beach renourishment.153 The opinion
cited a myriad of general authority and its prior opinions, including Florida
National Properties, in holding that the riparian right to alluvial deposits is
a property right that cannot be taken without compensation.154
B. Beach and Water Access Rights in Florida
In Florida, unconditional access rights to waterways inure solely to
riparian owners who hold title adjacent to navigable waters.'55 While Stop
the Beach Renourishment held that direct access from the parcel is not
necessary,156 the Florida Supreme Court held previously, in Crutchfield v. F
A. Sebring Realty Co., that riparian rights inure to a waterfront parcel and
may not be severed from that property.
The law of access to Florida non-navigable waters differs from
navigable water rights. While Florida Constitution article X, section 11
confirms sovereign rights below the high water line of navigable waters,
each owner of a parcel lying adjacent to a non-navigable waterbody owns a
proportionate share of the waterbed, extending to the center. All of the
adjacent parcels share a reasonable right to use the surface.'5 ' The Florida
Supreme Court in Duval v. Thomas, extended this rule to the situation
149. Id. at 209-14.
150. Id. at 214.
151. Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., Ltd., 512 So.2d
934 (Fla. 1987).
152. Id. at 941.
153. Id. at 939.
154. Id. at 936-37.
155. Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So.2d 795, 801 (Fla. 1957).
156. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't Envtl. Prot., 177 L. Ed. 2d 184, 208
(2010).
157. Crutchfield v. F. A. Sebring Realty Co., 69 So.2d 328, 329 (Fla. 1954).
158. Osceola Cnty. v. Triple E. Dev. Co., 90 So.2d 600, 602 (Fla. 1956) (en banc).
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where multiple persons own portions of a non-navigable water bottom.159
The Duval Court held that each owner of nonnavigable bottomlands shares
reasonable rights of fishing, swimming and boating.160
The most thorough treatment of rights in man-made waterbodies in
Florida is Anderson v. Bell.16' The Florida Supreme Court in Anderson held:
"[A]n owner of lands that lie contiguous to or beneath a portion of a
manmade lake has no right to the beneficial use of the entire lake merely by
virtue of the fact of ownership of the land."162 The landowner must establish
rights by covenants or by establishing an easement or license.163
The seminal Florida decision on-point is Brickell v. Town of Fort
Lauderdale.164 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed an injunction blocking
Brickell from barring public access between two streets that her husband
and she had platted on facing banks of the navigable New River.165 The
Court noted: "The courts have frequently said, and we find the same
expressions in the text-books, that it is 'inconceivable' and 'preposterous' to
contend that a town would be located on the banks of a navigable river and
the inhabitants deprived of the right of access to the river."166
Many water access cases address implied easement issues. Florida
follows the "unity" rule of platting, under which a deed that cites a plat that
includes a beach or park implies the grantee has access to that beach or
park. City of Miami v. Florida East Coast Railway Co.167 is the most
factually fascinating such decision. A plat included a park. This was found
to give non-exclusive, implied access by lot buyers to the park.168 The
public's use of the park created an implied dedication by the developer and
acceptance by the City that coexisted with the implied rights of the lot
buyers within the subdivision. Nonetheless, the developer's plat reserved
and therefore retained all riparian rights to the park. The dedicator's sale of
the waterfront strip to a railroad prior to the City's acceptance enabled the
159. Duval v. Thomas, 114 So.2d 791, 794-95 (Fla. 1959).
160. Id.
161. Anderson v. Bell, 433 So.2d 1202 (Fla. 1983).
162. Id. at 1207.
163. One of the authors addressed many of the rights of the public under Florida law to
waterfront access in Sid Ansbacher & Susan Cobb Grandin, Local Government Riparian Rights and
Authority, 70 FLA. B.J. 80-81 (1996).
164. Brickell v. Town of Fort Lauderdale, 78 So. 681 (Fla. 1918).
165. Id. at 681.
166. Id. at 684.
167. City of Miami v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 84 So. 726 (Fla. 1920).
168. Id. at 729.
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railroad to retain the portion of the park where the railroad had constructed
warehouses.' 69
The decision in City of Miami v. Eastern Realty' buttressed Florida
East Coast Railway Co. The subdividers dedicated a park strip to lot
buyers. The plat expressly forbade dedication to the public. Nonetheless, no
one objected to long-time City maintenance of the park. The court found
this implied a dedication to the City, which the City accepted by its
maintenance.' Further, the dedicator failed to reserve riparian rights
appurtenant to the park's waterfront. Therefore, the dedicator's successors
could not enjoin the City from filling City-owned submerged lands lying
adjacent to the park.' 72
Two Florida appellate decisions, issued nearly simultaneously, exhibit
the fact-specific nature of establishing access rights. Lanier v. Jones 73 cited
Cartish v. Soper 74 in holding that an easement running to the St. Johns
River carried the right to build a dock as a reasonable riparian
appurtenance.' 75 The court found that the dock did not interfere with the
servient owner's dock, one hundred feet away.176 Conversely, the same
court virtually simultaneously held that an "Easement Grant for Ingress and
Egress to [the] Intercoastal Waterway," which granted access "up to and
including the established bulkhead," did not grant any riparian rights,
including dockage, in the waters beyond that bulkhead. 77
C. The Public Trust Doctrine in Florida
Titles in Florida generally generate from one of three sources: (1)
Spanish grants to individuals issued prior to January 24, 1818; (2) Spanish
grants to the United States; and (3) federal grants to the territory and the
state. Each of these carried separate public trust duties.
Spanish land grants were confirmed by Congress pursuant to the Treaty
of Amity, Settlement and Limits Between the United States of America and
His Catholic Majesty, the King of Spain, February 22, 1918 (the "Adams-
169. Id. at 731-33.
170. City of Miami v. E. Realty Co., 202 So.2d 760 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
171. Id. at 772-73.
172. Id. at 768, 773.
173. Lanier v. Jones, 619 So.2d 387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
174. Cartish v. Soper, 157 So.2d 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
175. Lanier,619 So.2d at 388.
176. Id. at 387-88.
177. Hume v. Royal, 619 So.2d 12, 13-14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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Onis Treaty").' The Florida Supreme Court, in Apalachicola Land &
Development Co. v. McRae, explicated the Spanish colonial sovereign
public trust in navigable waters:
When Spain acquired territory by discovery or conquest in
North America, the possessions were vested in the crown;
and grants or concessions of portions thereof were made
according to the will of the monarch. While the civil law
was the recognized jurisprudence of Spain and its rules
were generally observed, yet the crown could exercise its
own discretion with reference to its possessions.
Under the civil law in force in Spain and in its provinces,
when not superseded or modified by ordinances affecting
the provinces or by edict of the crown the public navigable
waters and submerged and tide lands in the provinces were
held in dominion by the crown. . . and sales and grants of
such lands to individuals were contrary to the general laws
and customs of the realm.
By the laws and usages of Spain the rights of a subject or of
other private ownership in lands bounded on navigable
waters derived from the crown extended only to high-water
mark, unless otherwise specified by an express grant.179
To wit, the crown retained the navigable waters as the de facto colonial
highway in Florida. Grants along the waters provided access to the water
highway.
At statehood, Florida inherited a public trust duty to maintain
submerged lands under tidal waters and, as to nontidal waters, all lands
below the ordinary high water line.'so After common law and the 1970
Florida constitutional amendments limited sovereign submerged lands to
navigable waters, the reach of the public trust extended only over lands
178. Apalachicola Land & Dev. Co. v. McRae, 98 So. 505, 524 (Fla. 1923).
179. Id. at 518.
180. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 479 (1988) (summarizing
Oregon ex rel State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 374 (1977) as
confirming that the equal footing doctrine, admiralty jurisdiction and the public trust doctrine "extended
the [public trust] doctrine to waters which were nontidal but nonetheless navigable, consistent with [the
Court's] earlier extension of admiralty jurisdiction").
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below the mean and ordinary lines underlying tidal and nontidal navigable
waters, respectively.'
The Florida Supreme Court established the supremacy of the public
trust doctrine in Coastal Petroleum Co. v. American Cyanamid Co.'82 The
court held that the public trust in sovereign lands superseded private claims
only absent express, authorized grants.' 83 In State v. Black River Phosphate,
the court held that a strict public trust bars use of sovereign lands by
grantees in any manner that is not consistent with the public interest.' 84
Coastal Petroleum held that the public trust doctrine promoted
sovereign lands public trust obligations over private claims emanating from
swamp and overflowed lands patents."' The first Florida Constitution
emphasized a public purpose of "improving" swamp and overflowed lands:
A liberal system of internal improvements, being essential
to the development of the resources of the country, shall be
encouraged by the government of this State; and it shall be
the duty of the general assembly, as soon as practicable, to
ascertain by law, proper objects of improvement, in relation
to roads, canals and navigable streams, and to provide for a
suitable application of such funds as may be appropriated
for such improvement.' 86
The first Florida Legislature resolved to ask Congress to authorize a
survey of the Everglades.'"' The federal government appointed Buckingham
Smith in 1847 to inspect Lake Okeechobee and the Everglades for possible
public works. Smith's report recommended drainage of the lake to facilitate
improvement of the Everglades.'"' Ultimately, this led to the passage of the
Act of September 28, 1850.189 Of the 64,895,415 acres of such lands that
Congress ever granted, 20,325,013 were in Florida. The Swamp and
Overflowed Lands Act required that "[t]he proceeds of said lands, whether
181. See, e.g., Lee v. Williams, 711 So.2d 57, 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) ("In Florida, waters
are not considered navigable merely because they are affected by the rise and fall of the tides.
(citation omitted)).
182. Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 492 So.2d 339, 342 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied
sub nom. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987).
183. Id. at 343.
184. State v. Black River Phosphate, 13 So. 640, 648 (Fla.1893).
185. Coastal Petroleum Co., 492 So.2d at 343.
186. FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. XI, § 2 (repealed 1868).
187. S.J. Res. 5, 1st Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Fla. 1845).
188. S. REP. No. 30-242, at 16-17 (1848).
189. Swamp and Overflowed Lands Act, ch. 84, 9 Stat. 519 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 982-984
(2006)).
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from sale or by direct appropriation in kind, shall be applied exclusively, as
far as necessary, to the reclaiming [of] said lands by means of levees and
drains."' 90 Florida therefore received swamp and overflowed lands with a
public trust duty to "reclaim and facilitate the development of swamp and
overflowed lands."191
III. STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT
A. Background
On June 17, 2010, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion
in Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department of Environmental
Protection.19 2 Stop the Beach Renourishment reviewed the Florida Supreme
Court opinion in Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment (Walton
County). 93 The Florida Supreme Court held that chapter 161 of the Florida
Statutes, which fixes a waterfront boundary line after a public beach
renourishment project to replace the ambulatory mean high water line that
normally defines littoral property, did not constitute a facial taking of
private Gulf-front property.19' The new boundary would be set where the
eroded beach met the water, and the new fill would separate the formerly
waterfront parcel from the Gulf of Mexico.'95 The majority Florida Supreme
Court opinion was made over vehement dissents by Justices Lewis and
Wells, who urged that riparian and littoral rights carried rights of contact
with the adjacent navigable waters.196
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Stop the Beach Renourishment
principally addressed two issues. The first one concerned a significant
eminent domain question: Can a court be liable for a taking of private
property rights?197 The law clearly establishes liability against legislative
and executive branches for takings of property. 98 The Stop the Beach
Renourishment Court did not have a majority who determined that the
judicial branch can be liable for a taking.' 99 Nonetheless, Justice Scalia
190. Id.
191. Ansbacher & Knetsch, supra note 93, at 337, see supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
192. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 177 L. Ed. 2d 184 (2010).
193. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 998 So.2d 1102 (Fla. 2008).
194. Id. at 1108, 1121.
195. Id. at 1108, 1115.
196. Id. at 1121 (Wells, J. dissenting); id. at 1122 (Lewis, J. dissenting).
197. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 177 L. Ed. at 192.
198. Id. at 197.
199. Id. at 197, 199, 208.
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wrote for a four-Justice plurality opinion, which also included Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, that concluded there was no reason
to treat the judicial branch differently from the other two.200 Even if its
decision is not binding, the plurality thus showed a willingness to entertain
such claims. Further, Justice Scalia made it clear he was willing to push
hard to convince a future fifth Justice to follow suit, creating a majority
ruling.
This article focuses on the second issue: Did Florida's creation of a
fixed statutorily authorized "erosion control line" (ECL) that replaces the
normal property boundary, the ambulatory mean high water line (MHWL),
along the Gulf of Mexico or Atlantic Ocean constitute a compensable
taking of property rights of Gulf or oceanfront property owners?' 0' This
issue arises regardless of whether the act itself constitutes the taking or the
Florida Supreme Court's holding is the taking.
Under chapter 161 of the Florida Statutes, when a government conducts
beach renourishment, the resulting waterward boundary of the formerly
beachfront parcel becomes the ECL.202 The ECL is supposed to be located
where the parcel met the ocean or Gulf before the new sand was
deposited. 2 03
In Walton County and Stop the Beach Renourishment, private property
owners argued that Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust
Fund v. Sand Key Associates, Ltd. controlled. 2 04 The Florida Supreme Court
in Sand Key held that sand deposits accreting onto Gulf-front parcels vested
in the property owner, as long as third parties' activities led to the fill. 205 In
contrast, government and public interest representatives argued the
language in Sand Key was dicta.206 Those interests said that Martin v.
Busch207 controlled.208 In his opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment,
Justice Scalia noted:
200. Id. at 197.
201. Id.at 195,206.
202. FLA. STAT. §§ 161.141-161 (2010).
203. Id.
204. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 177 L.Ed. 2d at 207; Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach
Renourishment, 998 So.2d 1102, 1114 (Fla. 2008).
205. Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., 512 So.2d 934, 941
(Fla. 1987).
206. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 177 L. Ed. 2d at 208.
207. Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274 (Fla. 1972).
208. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 177 L. Ed. 2d at 207; Walton Cnty v. Stop the Beach
Renourishment, 998 So.2d 1102.
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In Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274 (1927), the
Florida Supreme Court held that when the State drained
water from a lakebed belonging to the State, causing land
that was formerly below the mean high water line [sic] to
become dry land, that land continued to belong to the
State.209
Writing for the Court's plurality, Justice Scalia concluded that Martin
provided sufficient background principles of Florida state property law to
support the Florida Supreme Court decision in Walton County.210 He
concluded that the deemed-artificial avulsion from beach renourishment
projects governed by chapter 161 was similar to reliction in Martin.2 1 1
Initially, Justice Scalia's reference to the mean high water line is legally
wrong. The mean high water line separates private uplands from submerged
lands underlying tidally influenced waters. Boundary lines between private
and public property in Florida along the Gulf of Mexico, which was what
was at issue in Stop the Beach Renourishment, are defined by the
MHWL. 2 12 Lake Okeechobee, the subject of Martin, is a non-tidally
influenced water body, where the ordinary highwater line, or OHWL, is the
sovereign boundary.213 Martin itself cites to the OHWL of the lake.214
The U.S. Supreme Court first accepted the MHWL as the sovereign
boundary of tidewaters in Borax Consolidated v. City of Los Angeles. The
MHWL is determined by an 18.6-year lunar cycle, which obviously cannot
apply to non-tidally influenced waters.216 (Borax used an 18.6 year cycle,
but the modern statutory determination in Florida Statute section 177.27 is
nineteen years.)2 17 Justice Curtis' concurrence in Howard v. Ingersolfl28 is
the most commonly cited test for determining the MHWL. He said one
should use soil and vegetation analysis.
In contrast, the Supreme Court expounded on the OHWL as the
boundary of non-tidal waters in Barney v. Keokuk.219 Under English
common law, only tidewaters were navigable for purposes of public
209. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 177 L. Ed. 2d at 206 (citing Martin, 112 So. at 287).
210. Id. at 207.
211. Id. at 207.
212. Id. at 192.
213. Martin, 112 So. at 284.
214. Ansbacher & Knetsch, supra note 93, at 364.
215. Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 26-27 (1935).
216. Id.
217. FLA. STAT. § 177.27 (2000).
218. Howard v. Ingersoll, 54 U.S. 381, 427-28 (1851) (Curtis, J., concurring).
219. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 336 (1876).
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ownership.220 Conversely, "[i]n this country, as a general thing, all waters
are deemed navigable which are really so."21 Coincidentally, the Martin
court noted the difficulty of determining the OHWL in flat and marshy
central and southern Florida.222
B. Martin v. Busch
The U.S. Supreme Court was vexed by Martin. The Justices puzzled at
oral argument why the Florida Supreme Court in Walton County had not
considered, let alone relied upon, this opinion. Multiple Justices asked the
advocates why that was so, if Martin appeared to support the Florida
Supreme Court decision.223 No one directly answered this question.
One can only guess why the Florida Supreme Court did not at least
mention Martin. Nonetheless, the Florida Supreme Court majority in Sand
Key found that Martin did not even address accretion or reliction.224 Rather,
the majority concluded that Martin's sole issue was a boundary dispute.225
The parties in Martin were arguing over which survey should be used to
identify the ordinary high water mark.226 The majority opinion in Sand Key
held that any language concerning reliction or accretion in Martin was
dicta.227 Justice Ehrlich wrote a spirited dissent.228 Nonetheless, Sand Key
appeared to be the Florida law until Walton County.
More to the point, Martin addressed a unique set of circumstances. No
one acquiring swamp and overflowed lands along the shore of Lake
Okeechobee in the early twentieth century had any reasonable expectation
of rights to develop waterward of their parcels. First, the Governor and
Cabinet did not enjoy the legislatively-delegated authority to grant
submerged lands until 1919, almost two decades after Busch's predecessors
received their original Swamp and Overflowed Lands patent from the State.
Second, the parcel lay next to dikes holding back the massive lake as part of




222. Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274, 283 (Fla. 1972).
223. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, 28, 56, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla.
Dep't Envtl. Prot., 177 L. Ed. 2d 184 (2010) (No. 08-1151).




227. Id. at 940.
228. Id. at 941-47 (Erlich, J., dissenting).
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By comparison, the authors are unaware of any beachfront parcels that
would be affected by chapter 161 beach renourishment that would be
deraigned from a Swamp and Overflowed Lands patent. The parcels in
Martin and Stop the Beach Renourishment are wildly disparate in location,
nature, and reasonable investment-backed expectations.
C. Public Access Grant
The Stop the Beach Renourishment decision discounted two
fundamental issues of real property law. The first is the historical
requirement under Florida law that a parcel touch the water in order to
maintain riparian rights.229 The dissent in Walton County cited numerous
Florida decisions in driving home that point.230 The obligation that a
riparian parcel touch the water is inherent in Florida property law. It is not
historically a mere "ancillary" right.23 1 It is noteworthy that the majority
opinion in Walton County cited no Florida precedent for its conclusion that
the right of contact with the water is ancillary.232
This riparian right of contact is no surprise to the State. Florida
Attorney General Opinion 85-47 opined that a local ordinance that barred
motor vessels within 300 feet of the public beaches would effect a taking of
any affected riparian rights.233 The Florida Attorney General emphasized:
"It has been a settled principle of law in this state for a number of years that
riparian or littoral rights are property rights that may not be taken without
just compensation." 234 The opinion cites as well to multiple decisions,
together with the then-existing version of today's section 253.141(1) of the
Florida Statutes, as "a partial codification of the common law on the
subject," and which statute stated, and still states in pertinent part, that
riparian rights "are appurtenant to and are inseparable from the riparian
land. The land to which the owner holds title must extend to the ordinary
high watermark of the navigable water in order that riparian rights may
attach."235 While Justice Scalia held that Florida has the right to fill in its
229. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 177 L. Ed. 2d 184, 206
(2010).
230. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 998 So.2d 1102, 1122 (Fla. 2008) (Lewis,
J., dissenting).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1119.
233. Re: Municipalities-Ordinances-Littoral Rights, 1985 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 133 (1985).
234. Id. (emphases omitted).
235. Id. (emphasis added).
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own sovereign lands, the Supreme Court opinion nowhere addresses
squarely this previously well-established right of direct contact.2 36
Frankly, the matter might be better addressed in as-applied challenges
where property owners can demonstrate direct impact on their lands.
Coincidentally, that is just what the property owners did originally in Stop
the Beach Renourishment, and they won at the first appellate level on
appeal of an administrative order authorizing the renourishment project.2 37
Two key points must be made that did not survive to United States Supreme
Court review.
First, the Florida First District Court of Appeal below, in Save Our
Beaches v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, treated the
impact of chapter 161 "as applied. 3 8 While the Florida Supreme Court in
Walton County stated that the lower appellate court certified the question of
whether Chapter 161 took riparian rights without compensation "in terms of
an as applied challenge," the Florida Supreme Court concluded "the First
District actually addressed a facial challenge." 239 That was not so. Not only
did the First District frame the issue before it as whether "the final
(administrative) order unconstitutionally applies Part I of Chapter 161,
Florida Statutes (2005)," but the record is rife with discussions of the
impacts of the project upon the properties themselves. 240
Indeed, the lower appellate court framed one issue as whether the
impairment of the property owners' riparian rights meant that the local
governments failed to establish "satisfactory evidence of sufficient upland
interest" as required by regulation 18-21.004(3) of the Florida
Administrative Code, to perform the renourishment project under the permit
on appeal.24 ' That rule requires in pertinent part that a government applicant
for a renourishment permit from the State need not establish that it is the
riparian owner adjacent to the sovereign lands being filled "provided that
such activities do not unreasonably infringe on riparian rights."242 While
the decision of that lower appellate court addressed, necessarily, general
Florida law of riparian rights, the issues as framed and decided were
expressly as-applied.
236. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 177 L. Ed. 2d 184, 208
(2010).
237. Save our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 27 So.3d 48, 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2006).
238. Id. at 55, 60.
239. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 998 So.2d 1102, 1105 (Fla. 2008).
240. Save our Beaches, Inc., 27 So.3d 48 at 56, 59.
241. Id. at 52.
242. Id. at 52.
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The Florida Supreme Court reframed the issue as a facial challenge to
chapter 161.243 Even if the Florida Supreme Court incorrectly saw the First
District decision as a facial claim, the higher court was entitled to reframe
the question "in a manner that it believes better suits the purposes of
review."244
Ironically, had the Florida Supreme Court not reframed the issues, it is
much less likely the United States Supreme Court would have accepted
jurisdiction. An as-applied case is necessarily far more limited to the facts
before the tribunal. By reframing the issue as a facial challenge, the Florida
Supreme Court made the property owners' challenge more difficult. It is
black letter law that virtually all facial challenges must show that the
challenged law cannot be applied constitutionally anywhere to any affected
person.2 45 Conversely, an as-applied challenger need show only that the law
is unconstitutional as applied to a narrow set of facts.246 Nonetheless, a
reframed, facial determination of chapter 161's constitutionality set up a
claim to the United States Supreme Court that the Florida Supreme Court
had fundamentally altered Florida riparian rights law. Ergot-the judicial
takings claim.
Second, the Florida Supreme Court reframed the nature of the property
owners' claims waterward of the ECL. The property owners raised, and the
First District addressed, the issue of whether the renourishment permit
effected a taking when it eliminated the property owners' "right to receive
accretions and relictions to their property,"247 citing to the Florida
Department of Environmental Protection order below, which "expressly
recognized" that section 161.191 of the Florida Statutes "eliminated" those
rights.248 Sand Key established that riparian owners vested accretions that
were placed as a result of governmental projects. 249 That the First District
held in accordance with Sand Key was no surprise.
The Florida Supreme Court reframed the issue from accretion to
avulsion. The higher court noted that the First District "fail[ed] to consider
243. Walton Cnty v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 998 So.2d at 1105.
244. Harry Lee Anstead et al., The Operation and Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida,
29 NOVA L. REV. 431, 528 (2005).
245. Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So.2d 250, 265 (Fla. 2005) (citing State
v. Bales, 343 So.2d 9, 11 (Fla. 1977)).
246. Id. at 265.
247. Save our Beaches, Inc., 27 So.3d at 54, 58.
2 4 8. Id.
249. See Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., 512 So.2d 934,
941 (Fla. 1987) (holding that accretions caused by development vested in a property owner that did not
participate in that development).
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the doctrine of avulsion, most likely because the parties did not raise the
issue before the First District."250 The Florida Supreme Court noted that it
held in Sand Key that accretion may alter boundaries, while avulsive events,
such as hurricanes, typically do not do so.251
As noted above, the Florida Supreme Court holds broad jurisdiction to
reframe issues certified to it for review. The court concluded that accretion
is per se inapplicable under chapter 161.252 It held that accretion is only a
contingent right, in that it vests solely when deposits are placed on
uplands.253 The majority held further that the right to accretion applies
solely to minimal additions, while chapter 161 applies to "critically eroded"
beaches and would necessarily involve substantial placement of fill. 254 It
held further that the new beach reduces any risk to the upland owner, so
there is reduced risk of erosion that should be counterbalanced by rights to
255 thaccretions. It held that any accretion rights disappear by statute once the
ECL becomes the fixed boundary, as the property loses direct contact with
the water.256 Finally, the littoral right of access remains,257 so any accretion
rights are tertiary.
The majority decision, upheld by the United States Supreme Court,
totally disregards section 161.191(2), which states in pertinent part that the
fixing of the ECL as the boundary eliminates the common law operation to
"increase or decrease the proportions of any upland property lying landward
of such line, either by accretion or erosion or by any other natural or
artificial process." 258 The statute clearly affects rights to accretion.
Justice Scalia's opinion essentially allowed the Florida Supreme Court
to reframe Florida riparian law to allow chapter 161 to eliminate the right of
riparian landowners to contact with the water without compensation. The
reframed issue leaves open the question, nominally, whether a particular
project affects a taking of property rights that requires the use of eminent
domain under section 161.141. Nonetheless, the breadth of the Walton
250. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 998 So.2d 1102, 1116 (Fla. 2008)
(emphasis added).
251. Id. at 1114, 1116.
252. Id. at 1118.
253. Id. at 1118.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1108.
257. Id. at 1118.
258. Id. at 1108; Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 177 L. Ed. 2d
184, 207 (2010).
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Beach dismissal of common law riparian rights undermines any upland
owner's claim for a finding of a taking or any substantial compensation.
The Stop the Beach Renourishment decision not only undercuts the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence requiring state property law to be based on
underlying principles of that state's property law to defeat takings claims, it
invites other states to creatively, if not baldly, reframe their water law to
accentuate public waterfront access at the expense of upland owners
without compensation. Of course, the procedural posture in which the
Florida Supreme Court reframed the case, and presented the appeal to the
Supreme Court, might have made the result that much more inevitable.
D. Constitutional Questions Left Unanswered
One fundamental question remains unanswered by Walton County and
Stop the Beach Renourishment. Chapter 161 amends the Florida
Constitution. It is fundamental law that a statute cannot contract or modify
constitutional rights.259 Nonetheless, this statute appears to do so.
Article X, section 11 of the Florida Constitution sets the sovereign
boundary at the mean high water line along beaches.2 60 That language is
unambiguous. It is beyond debate that the MHWL is an ambulatory
boundary. Nonetheless, section 161.191(2) of the Florida Statutes states:
Once the [ECL] along any segment of the shoreline has
been established in accordance with the provision of this
act, the common law shall no longer operate or decrease
the proportions of any upland property lying landward of
such line, either by accretion or erosion, or by any other
natural or artificial process.... 2 6 1
Insofar as the common law MHWL is incorporated by article X, section
11, the statute seems to amend the Florida Constitution's sovereign
boundary.
259. U.S. CONST. art. V
260. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11 (1970).
261. FLA. STAT. § 161.191(2) (2010); see Brief of Respondents at 6, Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 177 L. Ed. 2d 184, 192 (2010) (No. 08-1151) (quoting
FLA. STAT. § 161.191(2) (2010)).
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IV. MONTANA
A. Establishment ofRiparian Boundaries
In 1889, Montana became the forty-first state to enter the union.262
Shortly thereafter, the Montana Supreme Court was asked to address the
issue of the location of the boundary between riparian lands and navigable
rivers in Gibson v. Kelly.263 Mr. Gibson owned land adjacent to the Missouri
River. Mr. Kelly entered and occupied a strip of that land located between
the low and high water marks. In response to Mr. Gibson's claim to eject
Mr. Kelly from the strip of land, Mr. Kelly argued that Mr. Gibson's
property ended at the high water mark, and that Mr. Gibson was entitled to
use the land between the high and low water marks.
Mr. Kelly relied upon English common law in asserting that Mr.
Gibson's boundary ended at the high water mark of the Missouri River.264
The Montana Supreme Court noted that "the courts of different states have
followed different paths," some extending riparian ownership on navigable
streams to the high water mark, and others to the low water mark:
We have concluded, after a review of the decisions of other
states upon this subject, that, upon reason and authority,
and in view of all the circumstances of this state, we are
fully justified in holding that the boundary of land
bordering upon a navigable river should, whenever another
intent is not expressed, be held to extend to the ordinary
low-water mark.265
One of the factors taken into account by the Montana Supreme Court
was legislation enacted by the 1895 Montana legislature while the case was
pending.266 This legislation, adapted from the California Civil Code,
established the low-water mark as the boundary of riparian lands bordering
262. Enabling Act of Feb. 22, 1889, 25 Stat. 676 (1889).
263. Gibson v. Kelly, 39 P. 517, 518 (Mont. 1895).
264. Id. at 519. The territorial government of Montana had enacted legislation providing "[t]hat
the common law of England, so far as the same applicable and of a general nature, and not in conflict
with special enactments of this Territory, shall be the law and the rule of decision, and shall be
considered as of full force until repealed by legislative authority." 1887 Mont. Laws 647 (originally
enacted as 1865 Mont. Laws 356). The laws enacted by Montana's territorial government remained in
force after statehood until altered or repealed. MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. XX, § 1 (repealed 1972).
265. Gibson, 39 P. at 519.
2 6 6. Id.
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upon a navigable lake or stream.26 Ownership by riparian owners of land
bordering upon non-navigable bodies of water extended to the middle of the
lake or stream.268 The legislation also confirmed that the State of Montana
owned "all land below the water of a navigable lake or stream." 269
It is important to note that in this early decision, the Montana Supreme
Court recognized public trust principles, noting that although riparian
landowners own to the low-water mark on navigable rivers, "still the public
have certain rights of navigation and fishery upon the river and upon the
strip" of land between the high and low water marks.270 But because Mr.
Kelly's use of the land was not limited to fishing or navigation, this
principle did not apply, and the Court affirmed his ejectment from Mr.
Gibson's land.21
B. Early Conflicts Between Riparian Owners and the Public
In the first paragraph of his novella A River Runs Through It, Norman
Maclean captured the affinity of Montanans for fishing:
In our family, there was no clear line between religion and
flyfishing. We lived at the junction of great trout rivers in
western Montana, and our father was a Presbyterian
minister and a flyfisherman who tied his own flies .... He
told us about Christ's disciples being fishermen, and we
were left to assume, as my brother and I did, that all first-
class fishermen on the Sea of Galilee were fly fishermen
and that John, the favorite, was a dry-fly fisherman. 272
The Native American tribes that originally occupied Montana were
dependent upon its streams, rivers, and lakes not only as a source of food,
but as corridors of travel and commerce and as sites for inter-tribal
meetings and religious ceremonies. The nomadic tribes commonly camped
near streams and lakes. Early fur traders relied upon streams and lakes for
hunting, trapping, and trading. Huge steamboats paddled regularly up the
Missouri River to Fort Benton, transporting goods and people. Miners
267. Sec. 1291, Civ. C. 1895 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-201 (2009)).
268. Id.
269. Sec. 1091, Civ. C. 1895 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-1-202 (2009)).
270. Gibson, 39 P. at 519.
271. Id. at 519-20.
272. NORMAN MACLEAN, ARIVER RUNS THROUGH IT AND OTHER STORIES (1976).
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relied upon streams to develop and work their placer mines, and foresters
floated logs down them.
With Montana's water bodies serving so many different purposes, the
Montana Supreme Court has often been called upon to resolve conflicts
between competing stakeholders. One of the earliest conflicts arose in 1925,
when a landowner brought a trespass action against an avid sportsman for
repeatedly hunting and fishing on waters located within his large
landholdings. 273 The waters involved not only the navigable Missouri River,
but also a small non-navigable stream meandering through the plaintiff's
property that the sportsman had waded up from its confluence with the
Missouri River, as well as a small pond located wholly within the
landowner's property.274
The court first addressed the extent of riparian rights on the Missouri
River, which it declared (without discussion) to be navigable.275 The
landowner, relying upon English common law, asserted the right to control
the use of the river channel itself for all purposes except navigation. 276 The
court rejected this argument, noting that "the waters above the bed or
channel of a navigable stream at low-water mark are public waters and in
this the public have a right to fish," subject to state fishing regulations. 277
The court noted that the sportsman "also had the right to shoot wild ducks
upon the surface of the [navigable] stream or flying thereover, if he did not
trespass upon the plaintiff's adjacent property."278 The court ultimately
determined that the trespasser had committed a trespass when he walked
"above the ordinary low-water mark and in and above the ordinary high-
water mark and between said water marks." 279
With regard to the non-navigable stream, the court confirmed that the
riparian landowner owned "the channel of the [river]" and although he "did
not own the fish, ferae naturae, he had the exclusive right to fish for them
while they were in the waters." 280 The "public have no right to fish in a
273. Herrin v. Sutherland, 241 P. 328, 329 (Mont. 1925). Other issues were involved in the case
as well, including the right of the sportsman to fire a gun from a neighbor's property across the
landowner's property, the right of the sportsman to cross the landowner's property in order to reach and
hunt on adjacent public domain land, and the right to enter enclosed pastures to hunt. Id at 329-30.
274. Id.
275. See id. at 330 (explaining that the parties conceded that the Missouri River was navigable).
276. Id.
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non-navigable body of water, the bed of which is owned privately."281
Accordingly, the sportsman trespassed when, in pursuing his fish, he waded
up and down the beds of the non-navigable stream located on plaintiff's
land. The court also found that the fisherman trespassed when he crossed
the landowner's property to reach the small pond.282
Because the Herrin decision did not specify if the trespass on the
navigable river occurred as a result of the fisherman walking above the high
water mark only, or if it also resulted from his "tramping around" between
the low and high water marks, 28 3 the court created some uncertainty as to
whether a member of the public using a navigable river trespasses when
entering between the low and high water marks. In its 1895 Gibson v. Kelly
decision, the court had noted that the public had certain rights of navigation
and fishery upon the strip between the low- and high-water marks. 284
To resolve this ambiguity, at least with regards to fishing, the 1933
Montana legislature enacted the "angler's statute," which declared and
subjected the riparian landowner's title between the low and high water
marks to "the right of any person owning an angler's license of this state
who desires to angle therein or along their banks to go upon the same for
such purpose." 28 5 The angler's statute (which is still on the books) does not
apply to lakes (whether navigable or non-navigable), nor does it apply to
non-navigable streams located on private property. Although not titled as
such, this legislation is the first codification in Montana of the concept of
the public trust doctrine.
C. Expansion of the Public Trust Doctrine in Montana
In 1972, the people of Montana ratified a new constitution. 28 6 Unlike
the 1889 constitution, Montana's 1972 constitution expressly declares that
all waters within the state are the "property of the state for the use of its
281. Id.
282. Id. at 333.
283. The court characterized as a trespass the sportsman's tramping around "above the ordinary
low-water mark and in and above the ordinary high-water mark and between said water marks [of the
Missouri River.]" Id. at 331.
284. Gibson v. Kelly, 39 P. 517, 519 (Mont. 1895).
285. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-2-305 (2009).
286. For a discussion of the formation and adoption of the 1972 Montana Constitution, see
LARRY M. ELISON & FRITZ SNYDER, THE MONTANA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 7-17
(2001).
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people."287 The public's use of waters, however, is "subject to appropriation
for beneficial uses as provided by law."2 88
In its territorial days, Montana's economy was driven primarily by
agriculture and the extraction of its natural resources. Although these
industries continue to be an important part of Montana's economy, tourism
now significantly contributes to Montana's economy.289 Many people from
throughout the United States and the world come to Montana to enjoy its
spectacular scenery, pristine environment, and wide-open spaces. Among
these visitors are thousands of hunters, fishermen, and other visitors whose
recreational activities include use of Montana's numerous rivers, streams,
and lakes. But the most frequent users of Montana's waters are the residents
themselves.
The wide-open spaces that attract so many visitors to Montana are
dedicated primarily to agricultural uses. Ranchers and farmers rely upon
Montana's rivers, streams, and lakes to provide water for their crops and
livestock. To control livestock, many ranchers place fences across streams.
Although historically many of Montana's riparian owners allowed
trespasses by persons who walked along streams to catch fish, gather
berries, or similar uses, if such activities became "annoying or injurious,"
the landowners would "put a stop to them." 290
As the frequency of recreational use of Montana's waters increased, the
tolerance of some landowners began to wear thin as they dealt with the
higher volume of traffic. Although many users walked or floated down
rivers without leaving a trace of their presence, all ranchers have stories of
those who trampled banks, discarded garbage, damaged fences, harassed
livestock, and camped on private property without permission.
The Dearborn River flowed through several sections of land owned by
Michael Curran near the rugged eastern front of the Rocky Mountain range.
Mr. Curran, who used the land to raise livestock, placed fences across the
Dearborn at various locations. The floaters and anglers who scrambled up
the Dearborn's banks to portage around these barriers did not receive a
friendly welcome from Mr. Curran or his employees. The Montana
Coalition for Stream Access filed a lawsuit against Mr. Curran, asserting the
287. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3, cl. 3.
2 8 8. Id.
289. MONT. OFFICE OF TOURISM, MONTANA ANNUAL OFFICE OF TOURISM REPORT 2010, at 3
(2010), available at http://travelmontana.mt.gov/marketingplan/MTOTAnnualReportl0.pdf
290. Herrin v. Sutherland, 241 P. 328, 331 (Mont. 1925) (quoting Albright v. Cortright, 45 A.
634, 648 (N.J. 1900)).
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right of the public to recreate on the Dearborn River.29' Relying upon
Herrin v. Sutherland, Mr. Curran responded that because the Dearborn was
a non-navigable river, he was entitled to control the use of its channel
throughout his property.292 The district court determined:
[T]he Dearborn River is in fact navigable for recreation
purposes under Montana law; that recreation access to it is
determined by state law according to one criterion-
namely, navigability for recreation purposes; and that the
question of recreational access is to be determined
according to state, not federal, law.293
Mr. Curran appealed.
In its first decision to fully address the public trust doctrine, the
Montana Supreme Court ruled that although federal law applies in
determining whether a body of water is navigable for purposes of title (i.e.,
"who owns the streambed"), state law governs the test of "navigability" for
purposes of who can use the waters.294 Noting the Montana constitutional
provision that all "waters within the boundaries of the state are the property
of the state for the use of its people," 295 the court stated:
The capability of use of the waters for recreational
purposes determines their availability for recreational use
by the public. Streambed ownership by a private party is
irrelevant. If the waters are owned by the State and held in
trust for the people by the State, no private party may bar
the use of those waters by the people. The Constitution and
the public trust doctrine do not permit a private party to
interfere with the public's right to recreational use of the
surface of the State's waters.2 96
The effect of the court's ruling was, for the first time in Montana's
history, to bring non-navigable waters and recreational uses other than
291. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 165 (Mont. 1984).
292. Id. at 166, 170.
293. Id. at 165.
294. Id. at 167-68.
295. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3, cl. 3.
296. Curran, 682 P.2d at 170.
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fishing within the protection of the public trust doctrine.297 The court
concluded that the Dearborn River was navigable not only for purposes of
299title,298 but also for recreational purposes. In the companion case of
Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Hildreth the court applied the same
principles to allow recreational use of the non-navigable Beaverhead
River.300
In summary, the public has the right to use for recreational purposes
those waters in Montana that are "susceptible of recreational use,"
regardless of whether such waters are navigable or non-navigable for
purposes of title.30' The public's right extends not only to the area between
the high water marks,3 02 but also where landowners have erected fences or
other barriers across a river. "[T]he public is allowed to portage around
such barriers in the least intrusive manner possible, avoiding damage to the
adjacent owner's property and his rights," including entrance on the riparian
owner's property above the high water mark.303 This surprising extension of
the public trust doctrine to allow entrance onto private property above the
high water mark was issued with absolutely no discussion of its impact on
the property owner's "right to exclude," other than a warning that "the
public do not have the right to enter into or trespass across private property
in order to enjoy the recreational use of State-owned waters."304
D. Montana s Legislative Response
The 1985 Montana legislature responded by codifying the principles of
the Curran and Hildreth rulings in its enactment of the Montana
Recreational Use of Streams Act.305 The Act proclaims that except as
otherwise specifically provided, "all surface waters that are capable of
297. Id. at 170-71. The court dismissed Mr. Curran's reliance on the Herrin case in which an
angler was held liable for trespass on two accounts: for wading up a non-navigable stream and crossing
above the high water mark of a navigable stream. Id. The Curran court erroneously characterized the
Herrin case as irrelevant, without precedential value and "pure dicta." Id The Curran court in effect
overruled Herrin, noting that its holding "is contrary to the public trust doctrine and the 1972 Montana
Constitution." Id. at 171.
298. Id. at 166 (noting that the court's determination that the Dearborn River was navigable for
purposes of title was based upon four to five uses of the river for floating logs between 1887 and 1889
(the year Montana gained statehood)).
299. Id. at 170.
300. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Mont. 1984).
301. Id.
302. Curran, 682 P.2d at 172.
303. Hildreth, 684 P.2d at 1091 (citing Curran, 682 P.2d at 172).
304. Curran, 682 P.2d at 172.
305. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-301 to 322 (2009).
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recreational use may be so used by the public without regard to the
ownership of the land underlying the waters."306 Lakes are excluded from
coverage by the Act.307
In Montana, many riparian owners place fences across rivers to control
livestock or access.308 Fences are a common occurrence not only on non-
navigable streams, but also across many navigable rivers, such as the
Dearborn River, because these rivers are easily traversed by livestock and
people, not only when frozen in the winter but also during the summer
when flows are low as a result of irrigation or natural conditions.3 09
Not only did the Recreational Use of Streams Act codify the Curran
ruling granting recreational users the right to portage above the high water
mark around artificial barriers,310 it went a step further and required the
riparian landowner to bear the expense of constructing those portage
routes. 3 11 The Act also allowed the public to use streambeds of navigable
waters below the high water mark for certain uses not addressed in the
Curran case, including overnight camping, big game hunting, and the
erection of duck blinds and moorages. 312
Jack Galt and other landowners along the Smith River, a non-navigable
river that attracts numerous recreational users to its unblemished beauty,
immediately challenged the constitutionality of the Montana Recreational
Use of Streams Act, and asked the court to re-examine the issue of public
use of waters on non-navigable rivers.313 In Galt v. State, the Montana
Supreme Court re-affirmed the right of the public to use both navigable and
non-navigable waters for recreational purposes, but it narrowed its ruling in
Curran by stating:
306. Id. § 23-2-302(1).
307. Id. § 23-2-301(2)-(3). Although lakes are not governed by the Act, they were not excluded
from and are governed by the rule of decision issued in Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran,
682 P.2d 163, 172 (Mont. 1984).
308. In open range states such as Montana, an owner of livestock is generally not liable for the
trespass of her livestock onto the property of others, unless the livestock break into an enclosure that is
surrounded by a legal fence. Montana law also requires some negligence on the part of the livestock
owner before imposing liability for damages to the enclosed property. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-215;
Larson-Murphy v. Steiner, 15 P.3d 1205, 1212-13 (2000).
309. Several navigable rivers in Montana are quite shallow in all but the spring run-off season,
having been declared navigable based upon a handful of commercial uses by loggers or fur-traders in the
late nineteenth century. Although all rivers that have been determined to be navigable under the federal
test are subject to the federal navigational servitude, in fact very few of them are used for commercial
transport today.
310. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-311(1).
311. Id. § 23-2-311(3).
312. Id. §23-2-302(2)(d)-(f).
313. Galt v. State, 731 P.2d 912, 913-14 (Mont. 1987).
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[T]here is no attendant right that such use be as convenient,
productive, and comfortable as possible ... [A]ny use of
the bed and banks must be of minimal impact.314
The court struck down the statute's provisions allowing overnight camping,
the erection of duck blinds and moorages, and the hunting of big game as
overbroad. 3 15
The court also struck down as unconstitutional the imposition upon the
riparian landowner of the expense of constructing portage routes, noting
that the landowner "receives no benefit from the portage" and such costs
"should be borne by the State." 316
In clarifying its Curran ruling, the Montana Supreme Court
acknowledged that the effect of the public trust doctrine was to create an
easement "in favor of the public" upon privately-owned riparian lands.317 In
its attempt to reconcile the interests between the public and riparian
landowners, the Court stated:
This easement must be narrowly confined so that impact to
beds and banks owned by private individuals is minimal.
Only that use which is necessary for the public to enjoy its
ownership of the water resource will be recognized as
within the easement's scope. The real property interests of
private landowners are important as are the public's
property interest in water. Both are constitutionally
protected. 3 18
Although the court ruled that the imposition of portage costs upon riparian
landowners constituted an unconstitutional taking, it failed to address the
issue of whether the imposition of a portage route above the high water
mark constituted an unlawful taking, ruling summarily that the public trust
doctrine allowed entrance on private lands above the high water mark as
necessary to enjoy recreational use of the waters. 3 19
In spite of the Court's ruling striking down certain provisions of the
Montana Recreational Use of Streams Act as overbroad and
314. Id. at 915.
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unconstitutional, such provisions still remain on the books. Thus, based
upon a reading of the statute, many recreational users mistakenly believe
that they have the right, for example, to camp overnight between the low
and high water marks of navigable streams.
E. "Public" Versus "Private" Waters
The Montana Recreational Use of Streams Act restricts the public's use
of surface waters to "natural" water bodies.320 The public may not recreate
on private impoundments of water, such as stock ponds, nor upon water that
is being diverted for a beneficial use, such as irrigation ditches. 32'
The Mitchell Slough is a channel that diverts water from the Bitterroot
River for irrigation and other uses before returning sixteen miles later to the
Bitterroot. Although the slough was, at one point in time, a natural channel
of the Bitterroot, over the past century the Bitterroot, through natural
processes, had migrated away from the channel, requiring riparian owners
to make significant improvements to the channel, including the construction
of headgates and lifts, to assure a continuous flow of water. In a case that
began as an administrative proceeding to determine whether permits were
required to construct proposed improvements to the Mitchell Slough,322 the
case transformed into a highly publicized battle over the issue of whether
the surface waters of the Mitchell Slough were available to members of the
public for recreational use.323 The answer turned on whether the Mitchell
Slough was a natural body of water.324
After a bench trial at which substantial amounts of both written and
oral evidence were admitted, the district court ruled that the waters of the
Mitchell Slough were not available for recreational use by the public under
320. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-301(12) (2009) (defining "surface water," for the purpose of
determining the public's access for recreational use, as "a natural water body, its bed, and its banks up to
the ordinary high-water mark").
321. Id. § 23-2-302(2)(b)-(c).
322. In its first order, the district court upheld under a "clearly erroneous" standard, a ruling
made by the Bitterroot Conservation District (BCD) that the Mitchell Slough was not a natural
perennially flowing stream for purposes of the Natural Streambed and Land Preservation Act, MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 75-7-101 et seq. Bitterroot River Prot. Ass'n. v. Bitterroot Conservation Dist., No. DV-
03-476, 2006 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 575, at *7, *17 (D. Mont. Jan. 12, 2006) (Bitterroot 1). This act
regulates projects that result in "a change in the state of a natural, perennial-flowing stream or river, its
bed, or its immediate banks." MONT. CODE ANN. § 103(5)(a) (2009). As a result, the landowners were
not required to obtain a permit to make proposed improvements to the Mitchell Slough. Bitterroot I,
2006 Mont. Dist. LEXIS at *15.
323. Bitterroot River Protective Ass'n v. Bitterroot Conservation Dist., 198 P.3d 219, 222-23
(Mont. 2007) (Bitterroot II).
324. Id. at 227-28.
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the Montana Recreational Use of Stream Act.325 The district court found
that the Mitchell Slough fell within an exception excluding public use of
waters that had been "diverted away from a natural water body for
beneficial use." 326
[T]here is clear and convincing evidence that if man had
not manipulated the waters of the Bitterroot River with the
Tucker Headgate and other diversions and also excavated
the channel of the Mitchell Slough, the Mitchell would no
longer flow and it would most likely be a series of ancient,
paleo channels connected by man. Nearly all of the credible
scientific evidence supports the conclusion that the
Mitchell Slough is no longer a natural water body. 327
The Montana Supreme Court, ina unanimous opinion, ruled that the
district court had erred in its interpretation of what constitutes a "natural
water body" for purposes of the Montana Recreational Use of Streams
Act. 328 The Montana Supreme Court construed the district court's
interpretation of natural as requiring "a pristine river unaffected by
humans." 329 It rejected this interpretation as "too narrow and inconsistent
with the purposes," noting that few Montana streams and rivers would
qualify since most have been modified by man in some form or another.3 30
Although the Montana Supreme Court did not provide a definition of
natural, it stated that "[e]vidence of the extent of man's efforts must be
considered in conjunction with all other circumstances in a fact-driven
inquiry."33' The Court considered the following evidence in concluding that
the Mitchell Slough was a natural body of water:
(1) its perennial flow; 33 2
325. Id. at 222.
326. Id. at 236 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-302(2)(b)).
327. Bitterroot River Prot. Assoc. v. Bitterroot Conservation Dist., 2006 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 576,
at *5-*6 (D. Mont. May 9, 2006).
328. Bitterroot II, 198 P.3d at 239.
329. Id. at 238.
330. Id. at 242. The district court had relied upon a definition of "natural" from Webster's
Dictionary as "arising from; in accordance with what is found in nature; not artificial or manufactured."
Id.
331. Id. at 238.
332. Id. at 239.
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(2) the increase in flow from its point of diversion (18.2
cubic feet per second) to the point where it returns to the
Bitterroot (43.9 cubic feet per second);33
(3) its use as a collection system for return irrigation flows
and other surface waters; 334
(4) its natural origin and the continuing presence of
significant portions of the channel in their historic
location;335 and
(5) its fisheries. 3 36
The Montana Supreme Court also found that the district court had not
given sufficient weight to the Mitchell Slough's capacity for recreational
use, as evidenced by a long history of actual usage of its waters by
fishermen, hunters, and boaters. 337 The court concluded:
[T]here is more "going on" here than simply a diversion of
water to satisfy water rights. The "huge volume of water"
which the District Court noted was diverted by Tucker
Headgate dedicates a public resource to a multiplicity of
functions discussed herein. Thus, while the Mitchell has
been improved primarily by irrigators, it is much more than
an irrigation ditch. If the Mitchell was simply an irrigation
ditch, there would likely be little or no water flowing in it
outside of irrigation season. Here, however, the Mitchell
flows year-round and presents the characteristics of a
stream throughout all seasons, a condition which, as the
District Court acknowledged, has been enhanced by the
Landowners. 338
F Expansion of the Definition of "Navigable"
On June 13, 1805, Captain Meriwether Lewis arrived at the Great Falls
of the Missouri River, the first in a series of waterfalls "which I readily
333. Id. at 241.
334. Id. at 240.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 241.
337. Id. at 236-37.
338. Id. at 241-42.
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perceived could not be encountered with our canoes."339 Thus began an
arduous portage of approximately eighteen miles that was completed on
July 14, 1805. Today, Ryan Dam sits at the site of the Great Falls,
construction of which was completed in 1915 pursuant to a license issued
by the federal government.340
In 2003, the parents of several Montana school children asserted a
claim in federal court that the owners and operators of certain hydroelectric
facilities (including Ryan Dam) should be paying rent to Montana because
of the location of their facilities on the Missouri, Madison, and Clark Fork
Rivers, which the plaintiffs classified as state-owned navigable rivers. 34 1
Although the suit was dismissed from federal court for lack of jurisdiction,
the matter ultimately ended up before the Montana Supreme Court. 34 2
Whether or not the owners of the hydroelectric facilities owed rent to
Montana depended upon the "navigability" status of the Missouri, Madison,
and Clark Fork Rivers at the time of statehood.343 Montana asserted that
these rivers were navigable, and the state owned title to their streambeds. 34 4
PPL Montana asserted that these rivers were not navigable at the locations
on which the hydroelectric facilities were sited.34 5
In rendering its decision, the Montana Supreme Court noted that the
terms "navigability" and "commerce" have been very liberally construed by
the United States Supreme Court.346 The Court also relied heavily upon the
U.S. Supreme Court decision of United States v. Utah.347 In the Utah case,
the U.S. Supreme Court determined that a 4.35-mile stretch of the Colorado
River was navigable, while other stretches were not.348 The U.S. Supreme
Court noted generally that conclusions as to navigability should be confined
to the particular sections to which the controversy relates.349 In contrast, the
Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's conclusion that all
339. THE JOURNALS OF LEWIS AND CLARK 138 (Bernard deVoto ed., 1997).
340. PPL Mont., LLC v. State, 229 P.3d 421, 426 (Mont. 2010).
341. Id.
342. Id. at 427.
343. Id. at 447.
344. Navigable Water Ways Owned by the State of Montana and Administered by the
Department of State Lands, INTERNET ARCHIVE,
http://www.archive.org/stream/navigablewaterwaOOmontrich/navigablewaterwaOOmontrich djvu.txt
(last visited Dec. 15, 2010) (asserting that the Clark Fork and Missouri Rivers were navigable, but
claimed only the middle section of the Madison River as navigable).
345. PPL Mont., LLC, 229 P.3d at 463 (Rice, J., dissenting).
346. Id. at 446 (majority opinion).
347. Id.
348. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 89-90 (1931).
349. Id. at 77.
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three rivers were navigable in their entirety.350 The Montana court noted that
the stretches of river on which the facilities at issue were located (including
a 17-mile stretch of the Missouri River) were merely "short interruptions"
that did not affect the navigability of the entire river.35'
In determining the navigability of the Madison River, the Montana
Supreme Court relied upon a single use in 1913 (more than twenty years
after statehood) of the river for a commercial log float.352 The Montana
court also concluded that the district court's reliance on evidence of present
day uses of the Madison, primarily recreational, was sufficient to establish
the susceptibility of the Madison for commercial use at the time of
statehood.353
PPL Montana has petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for writ of
certiorari.3 54 Among other issues, it has challenged as overly broad the
Montana Supreme Court's definition of navigability for purposes of title.355
If upheld, the decision has the potential to bring numerous Montana rivers
within the definition of "navigability" for purposes of title, particularly if
the U.S. Supreme Court sustains the use of present-day commercial
recreational ventures as evidence to establish, at the time of statehood, the
navigability of a river in its entirety.
G Perpendicular Access
The Montana Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
public's right to use the streambeds of navigable and non-navigable waters
for recreation does not create a right to access those waters across private
property.356 In spite of a Montana statute proclaiming that a "prescriptive
easement cannot be acquired through . .. recreational use of surface
waters," including an easement for the purpose of "entering or crossing of
350. PPL Mont., LLC, 229P.3dat460-61.
351. Id. at 449.
352. Id. at 435. Although several circuits have adopted a "log-floating test" in determining the
navigability of the river, e.g., Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 644 F.2d 785, 788-89 (9th Cir.
1981), the U.S. Supreme Court has not. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S.
690, 698 (1899) ("The mere fact that logs, poles and rafts are floated down a stream occasionally and in
times of high water does not make it a navigable river.").
353. PPL Mont., LLC,229P.3dat448.
354. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, PPL Mont., LLC v. State, 229 P.3d 421, 426 (Mont. 2010)
(No. 10-218).
355. Id. at2-3.
356. See, e.g., Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 172 (Mont. 1984)
(explaining that the public's right to use the streambeds of navigable and non-navigable waters for
recreational use does not create a right of access to those waters across private property).
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private property to reach surface waters," 357 in Wolf v. Owens the Montana
Supreme Court (without a mention of the statute) granted a prescriptive
easement across private property for access to the surface waters of the
Middle Fork of the Flathead River for recreational use.35 8
In Montana, riparian owners often fence to the abutments of bridges for
purposes of livestock and access control. In 2004, the Public Land Access
Association (PLAA) brought a suit in Madison County contending that the
public trust doctrine entitles the public to access the Ruby River from
public rights of way, including public bridges crossing the Ruby River.3 59
The PLAA argued that fences installed by landowners up to the abutment of
a public bridge were "encroachments" onto the public right of way, and
must be removed to allow access to the river by recreational users.360 The
defendant riparian landowners responded that the public's right to use
surface waters does not include a right to enter onto or cross private
property, and that the public was required to use public access sites to reach
the waters of the Ruby River.3 61
In a decision that considered the interests of both parties, the district
court ruled that the county had authority to allow landowners to construct
fences to the ends of bridges for appropriate reasons, including livestock
control.362 It also ruled that, to access rivers, the public has the right to use
the public right of way upon which bridges are constructed (generally about
sixty feet on either side of the bridge).363 Thus, the court permitted
landowners to keep their fences, as they were not an "encroachment" on the
public right of way, but required them to install gates to facilitate public
364
access.
In 2009, the Montana legislature responded with House Bill 109,
establishing a right of the public to access surface waters for recreational
use by using public bridges and rights of way.365 The statute also recognizes
the right of landowners to fence up to a bridge's abutment "for livestock
357. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-322 (2009).
358. Wolf v. Owens, 172 P.3d 124, 126-27, 130 (Mont. 2007).
359. Public Lands Access Assoc., Inc. v. Madison Cnty., No. DV-29-04-43, at 4-5 (D. Mont.
Oct. 1, 2008), available at http://www.plwa.org/viewarticle.php?id=67 (order regarding motions for
summary judgment).
360. Id. at 4.
361. Id. at 5.
362. Id. at 11-13.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-312 (2009).
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control or property management" 366 as long as such fences "provide for
public passage to surface waters for recreational use." 367 The State must
provide "the materials, installation, and maintenance of any fence
modifications necessary to provide public passage." 368
H Summary of Montana Developments
Although the early Montana courts and legislature strongly protected
riparian rights (1) by extending riparian ownership to the low-water mark of
navigable waters and to the middle of non-navigable waters, 369 and (2) by
affirming the riparian owner's right to exclude the public's use of privately-
owned streambeds, 37 0 these rights have progressively eroded. The first
erosion was slight (and, in view of Montana's affinity for fishing, caused
little controversy)-the adoption in 1933 of the "angler's statute" allowing
fishermen to enter onto the banks of navigable rivers between the low- and
high-water marks for purposes of fishing.37' The second erosion was
monumental-the expansion of the public trust doctrine to allow public use
of both navigable and non-navigable streambeds for recreational use. 3 72
Although the Montana Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional
legislation that imposed the cost of portage routes upon private landowners
and allowed public use of private property for camping and big-game
hunting, it has failed to fully address whether property owners should be
compensated for the easement the Court has recognized in favor of the
public to enter onto private property for recreational use of surface
waters. 373
In recent years, the rights of riparian landowners have continued to
erode as a result of:
(1) the extension of public recreational rights in channels
that exist today based solely upon man-made
improvements;374
366. Id. § 7-14-2134.
367. Id. § 23-2-313(1).
368. Id. § 23-2-313(3).
369. Gibson v. Kelly, 39 P. 517, 519 (Mont. 1895).
370. Herrin v. Sutherland, 241 P. 328, 331 (Mont. 1925).
371. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-2-305.
372. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 172 (Mont. 1984).
373. Id.; Galt v. State, 731 P.2d 912, 916 (Mont. 1987).
374. Bitterroot River Protective Ass'n v. Bitterroot Conservation Dist., 198 P.3d 219, 241-242
(Mont. 2007).
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(2) the application of "navigable" status to an entire river if
a single stretch is, in fact, navigable; 37
(3) consideration of present-day uses, such as commercial
guiding activities, in determining if a river was navigable at
the time of statehood; 37 6
(4) turning a blind eye to the statutory prohibition against
the acquisition of prescriptive easements across private
property for access to surface waters for recreational use;
377 and
(5) obligating riparian owners to construct fences abutting
public bridges in a manner that allows public passage to the
river.3 78
In Stop the Beach Renourishment, the U.S. Supreme Court has
indicated its reluctance to interfere with a state's power to define the limits
of riparian property rights. The U.S. Supreme Court will have the
opportunity to review the extent of its deference to state authority to modify
riparian property rights if it accepts certiorari in the PPL Montana case.
V. OTHER CREATIVE EFFORTS TO EFFECTUATE PUBLIC
ACCESS TO WATERFRONTS
A brief recitation of several other jurisdictions' efforts to grant or to
protect public access to waterfronts emphasizes the schism between public
access and private property within coastal communities. We will turn to
Hawaii and Texas, each of which presents a fascinating access issue.
A. Hawaii
Hawaii statute provides that the public has a right of access to and
along shores that lie below the "upper reaches of the wash of the waves." 379
The various counties generally hold primary duty to establish and maintain
access under sections 46-6.5, 115-5, and 115-7 of the Hawaii Revised
375. PPL Mont., LLC v. State, 229 P.3d 421, 449 (Mont. 2010).
376. Id. at 447.
377. Wolf v. Owens, 172 P.3d 124, 130 (Mont. 2007).
378. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-313(1) (2009).
379. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 115-4, 115-5 (1993).
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Statutes. Additionally, chapter 205A makes the State responsible for
preserving coastal resources and assisting the public access on and below
the shoreline.380
While most public access is established by easement or similar right-of-
way, Hawaii established its Na Ala Hele trails system, also known as the
Statewide Trail and Access Program, by enactment of chapter 198D in
1988, to facilitate access to and between beaches and other resources by
confirmation of "ancient," or pre-western contact, trails. 38 1 Section 198D-2
of the Hawaii Revised Statutes "direct[ed] [the Department of Land and
Natural Resources (DLNR)] to plan, develop, [and] acquire land or rights
for public use of land, construct and engage in coordination activities to
implement a trail and access system."38 2 The Na Ala Hele trail system is
supposed to utilize ancient and historic trails.38 3
Perhaps the most important such trail is the Ala Kahakai National
Historic Trail, which is addressed thoroughly in the National Park Service,
Ala Kahakai National Historic Trail Comprehensive Management Plan.384
The plan states that this trail extends about 175 miles "lateral to the
shoreline or, within the trail corridor, run mauka-makai (from sea toward
the mountain)," from "the northern tip of Hawaii ... around South Point to
the eastern boundary of Hawai'i Volcanoes National Park." 385 This trail,
typical of the Na Ala Hele system, combines three kinds of Hawaii trails:
(1) surviving elements of the ancient ala loa, the long trail,
which natives made before western contact in 1778;
(2) historic trails that developed on or parallel to the
traditional routes post-contact (1778), and before the
Highways Act of 1892 (typically, alanui aupuni
(government roads) began in 1847); and
380. Id. § 205A-2 (2001).
381. Id. § 198D.
382. Div. FORESTRY & WILDLIFE, HAW. DEP'T LAND & NAT. RES., REPORT TO THE TWENTY-
FOURTH LEGISLATURE: REGULAR SESSION OF 2008: HAWAII STATEWIDE TRIAL AND ACCESS SYSTEM
"NA ALA HELE," at 2 (2008).
383. HAW. REV. STAT. § 198D-2; see infra note 384 and accompanying text.
384. NAT'L PARK SERV., ALA KAHAKAI NATIONAL HISTORIC
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(3) more recent pathways and roads that created links
between these ancient and historic segments. 386
Notwithstanding the statutory confirmation of "ancient" and "historic"
public access rights, the public's access to Hawaiian shores is not
unconditional. The Petition for Writ of Certiorari in Stop the Beach
Renourishment cited famous appellate decisions that originated in Hawaiian
water law,38 7 and which addressed, or even created, dramatic shifts in long-
established water rights in that state. The Hawaiian property rights blog,
maintained by Honolulu attorney Robert Thomas, discussed the Robinson
decision, together with myriad related decisions that have been issued since
1959.388 The Robinson case originated in a private dispute over the surplus
water rights in a Kauai stream, which was resolved in a 65-page decision
based on ancient, historic, and state water law.3 89 The Hawaiian Supreme
Court on appeal held sua sponte that neither party held any rights to the
waters.390 Instead, the court held the State possessed the rights.39' Justice
Levinson's vehement dissent on rehearing contended that the court
"effectuated an unconstitutional taking of the appellants' and cross-
appellants' property without just compensation and should be reversed on
this ground as well." 392 After substantial jousting, the case is languishing
back at trial court.
Sotomura was a federal suit following a Hawaii Supreme Court
decision that found no compensable taking when the waterfront boundary
was changed from the common law mean high-water mark to "the upper
reaches of the waves" as set in the 1974 enactment of section 115-5 of the
Hawaii Revised Statutes.393 The federal district court held that the
definition, still found in today's Hawaiian statute, has no "legal, historical,
386. Id.
387. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 31-32, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't
Envtl. Prot., 177 L. Ed. 2d 184 (2010) (No. 08-1151) (citing Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468, 1474
(9th Cir. 1985), rev 'd on procedural grounds, 477 U.S. 902 (1986); Sotomura v. Cnty. of Haw., 460 F.
Supp. 473 (D. Haw. 1978)).
388. On Judicial Takings, and the Hawaii Water Rights Backstory in Stop the Beach
Renourishment, INVERSECONDEMNATION.COM (June 24, 2009),
http://www.inversecondemnation.com/inversecondemnation/2009/06/on-judicial-takings-hawaii-water-
rights-and-stop-the-beach-renourishment.html.
389. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1336 (1973), on rehearing, 517 P.2d 26
(1973) (per curiam).
390. Id. at 1338-39.
391. Id.
392. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 517 P.2d 26, 27 (1973) (Levinson, J., dissenting).
393. Sotomura v. Cnty. of Haw., 460 F. Supp. 473, 476, 480 (D. Haw. 1978)
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factual or other precedent."3 94 Rather, the high water mark had long been
the legal and historical oceanfront boundary in Hawaii:
The [state Supreme Court] decision in Sotomura was
contrary to established practice, history and precedent, and,
apparently, was intended to implement the court's
conclusion that public policy favors extension of public use
and ownership of the shoreline. A desire to promote public
policy, however, does not constitute justification for a state
taking private property without compensation.3 95
B. Texas
Texas courts have discussed numerous aspects of that state's public
beach access case law and statutes. In the first recent decision, the Texas
First District Court of Appeals in Brannan v. State, addressed a significant
public access issue arising under that state's Open Beaches Act.3 96 That act
generally grants public access to any portion of a beach as follows:
[A]ny beach area, whether publicly or privately owned,
extending inland from the line of mean low tide to the line
of vegetation bordering on the Gulf of Mexico to which the
public has acquired the right of use or easement to or over
the area by prescription, dedication, presumption, or has
retained a right by virtue of continuous right in the public
since time immemorial, as recognized in law and
Custom .... 397
Further, the Act requires a notice to purchasers of Gulf-front or nearby
parcels that a structure that lies or is rendered seaward of the vegetation line
as a result of natural processes may be removed. 398 The statute dictates the
form of notice. 39 9
After the trial court in Brannan ordered the structures at issue removed
from the public easement that the court found had "rolled" upland onto the
394. Id. at 480.
395. Id. at 481.
396. Brannan v. State, No. 01-08-00179-CV, 2010 WL 375921, at *19 (Tex. Comm'n App. Feb.
4, 2010); see TEXAS NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 61.001-254 (West 2001 & Supp. 2009) (covering the use
and maintenance of public beaches).
397. Id. § 61.001(8).
398. Id. § 61.025.
399. Id.
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private lots, "forces of nature," rather than the government, removed all but
three of the houses prior to the appellate decision.400 The appellate court
held it had jurisdiction to address whether to remove the three remaining
structures. 40 1 Also, and significantly, the court found the refusal of the
government to maintain the structures and the imposition of the "rolling
easement" under chapter 61 as erosion occurred did not constitute
compensable takings, either together or alone. 402
The appellate court noted that Arrington v. Mattox held that the Act
does not itself create a public beach easement where none exists.4 03 The
State contended that there existed an implied dedication and acceptance of
public use.404 The appellate court found that for at least forty years, the
public had used the local beach where the properties were located.4 05 The
public had used the beach up to the line of vegetation without asking any
private permission for typical beach activities. Finally, members of the
public had kept the beach clean. Accordingly, the public obtained easements
by implied dedication. 40 6
The Brannan Court cited various intermediate Texas appellate decisions
that upheld rolling easements under the Open Beaches Act and common
law.4 07 The Court emphasized Matcha v. Mattox ex rel the People of Texas,
which analogized the rolling easement to the common law ambulatory
beach title boundary line at the high water mark.40 8
The Court reviewed the background of the Open Beaches Act.4 09 It
stated the Texas Legislature passed the act in response to Luttes v. State,4 10
to protect public interest in and use of public beaches. Luttes confirmed that
the State owned between the mean-low and mean-high-tide lines, or the
wet beach."4 1' Private ownership was confirmed as bounded by the mean-
400. Brannan, 2010 WL 375921, at *13, *17-*18 (stating that hurricanes and an extraordinary
high tide, called a "bull tide," destroyed the other buildings and structures).
401. Id.at*14.
402. Id. at *8.
403. Arrington v. Mattox, 767 S.W2d 957, 958 (Tex. App. 1989) (denying writ).
404. Brannan, 2010 WL 375921, at *15.
405. Id.at*17.
406. Id.
407. Id. at *18-19.
408. Id. at *18 (citing Matcha v. Mattox exrel. Tex., 711 S.W2d 95, 98-100 (Tex. App. 1986)).
409. Id. at *20.
410. Luttes v. State, 324 S.W2d 167 (Tex. 1958).
411. See id at 187, 191 (describing state holdings as the shore "regularly covered and
uncovered by the tide").
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high water line.412 Before Luttes, it was believed that the State owned both
the wet and dry beaches.413 The Open Beaches Act was passed to protect
previously understood public rights to the Gulf beaches.4 14
The Brannan Court distinguished Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, where the Nollans were refused a permit unless they gave a
public easement between the mean-high-tide mark and their seawall.4 15
Conversely, the Brannan court stated the Open Beaches Act does not create
any public easement; rather, it only protects rights created in a public
easement.4 16 Here, there was no taking because the homeowners took title
subject to a longstanding public easement waterward of the vegetation
line. 417 As erosion, a massive high tide, or "bull tide," and hurricanes moved
the line landward, the structures could be moved without compensation.418
One wonders, however, if the high tide and hurricane's effect were properly
considered in the rolling easement. The one Texas decision that most
directly addressed sudden, avulsive events that "tear away" physical
uplands found that avulsion does not alter legal water boundaries.419 In
Coastal Industrial Water Authority v. York,420 the Texas Supreme Court cited
numerous decisions nationwide and in Texas for this proposition.421
The Brannan Court observed that the Texas Supreme Court had
recently heard oral argument in Severance v. Patterson, on certified
question from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The first issue presented
was whether a public beach easement may "roll" when the line of
vegetation moves to lands that originally lay landward of the physical
easement.422 The Brannan Court rendered its decision because the
remaining three property owners asked for prompt disposition while their
structures remained standing.423 The two additional certified questions were
whether the rolling easement right emanates in common law or the Open
412. Id. (defining the Texas rule to be the same as the common law "mean high tide" rule and
basing it on the "mean highest tide" of the two high tides).
413 Brannan, 2010 WL 375921, at *20 (citing to Neal Pirkle, Maintaining Public Access to
Texas Public Beaches: The Past and the Future, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 1093, 1093-94 (1994)).
414. Id. at *22.
415. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm., 483 U.S. 825, 836, 841-42 (1987).
416. Brannan, 2010 WL 375921, at *22.
417. Id. at *26.
418. Id.
419. Coastal Indus. Water Auth. v. York, 532 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. 1976).
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Brannan, 2010 WL 375921, at *22 (citing Severance v. Patterson, 566 F.3d 490, 502-03
(5th Cir. 2009)).
423. Id. at *28.
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Beaches Act, and whether any compensation was due for the relocated
easement.424 Oral argument in Severance took place November 19, 2009.
It must be noted that the majority of the panel in the Fifth Circuit
Severance case did not find Texas law regarding rolling easements nearly as
clear as did the Brannan court. The federal majority stated that Texas
decisions finding the rolling easement did not affect a taking "offered little
to no analysis of the takings issue."4 25 The panel majority stated Texas
courts were inconsistent as well in determining "[w]hether the public's
beach access easement arises by virtue of common law and under what
theory-prescription, implied dedication, custom or the OBA itself ... "426
Accordingly, the Severance majority concluded the following required
certification: "Indubitably, no "fixed" background principles of state law
are articulated, only mutually inconsistent post hoc rationales. The state
Supreme Court must sort out the confusion."427
The Texas Supreme Court answered the certified question on
November 5, 2010, in Severance v. Patterson.428 The Patterson majority
found that a public easement on Gulf-front beach does not automatically
"roll" landward after an avulsive event:
Once [a lateral public beach easement is] established, we
do not require the State to re-establish easements each time
boundaries move due to gradual and imperceptible
changes to the coastal landscape. However, when a
beachfront vegetation line is suddenly and dramatically
pushed landward by acts of nature, an existing public
easement on the public beach does not "roll" inland to
other parts of the parcel or onto a new parcel of land.
Instead, when land and the attached easement are
swallowed by the Gulf of Mexico in an avulsive event, a
new easement must be established by sufficient proof to
encumber the newly created dry beach bordering the
ocean. 4 29
424. Id. at *27.
425. Severance,566 F.3d at 498-99.
426. Id. at 499; see supra note 417 and accompanying text. Contra Brannan, 2010 WL 375921,
which concluded that the OBA itself protects, but does not create, public beach easements.
427. Severance, 566 F.3d at 499 n.8 (citing Neil E. Pirkle, Note, Maintaining Public Access to
Texas Coastal Beaches: the Past and the Future, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 1093 (1994)).
428. Severance v. Patterson, No. 09-0387, 2010 WL 4371438 (Tex. 2010).
429. Id. at *1 (emphasis added).
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The Texas Supreme Court expressly disapproved of the Matcha line of
cases. 4 30
Specifically, Patterson concluded that the several lower Texas appellate
courts finding that a rolling easement existed missed the point:
The [Matcha] court held that legal custom-"a reflection in
law of long-standing public practice"-supported the trial
court's determination that a public easement had
"migrated" onto private property. The court reasoned that
Texas law gives effect to the long history of recognized
public use of Galveston's beaches, citing accounts of public
use dating back to time immemorial, 1836 in this case.
However, the legal custom germane to the matter is not the
public use of the beaches, it is whether the right in the
public to a rolling easement has existed since time
immemorial. The Matcha court's recognition of long-
standing "custom" in public use of Galveston's beaches
misses the point of whether a custom existed to give effect
to a legal concept of a rolling beach, which would impose
inherent limitations on private property rights. 43 1
The Court cited Nollan in holding that imposition of an easement absent
such a historically based rolling easement would require compensation. 432
Justice Medina dissented and Justice Lehrmann joined.433 Justice
Medina contended that the majority made an unsupported, "vague
distinction between gradual and sudden or slight and dramatic changes." 434
Needless to say, the Patterson majority is the converse of the Walton Beach
and Stop the Beach Renourishment decisions, in holding that accretion and
erosion alter oceanfront boundaries, while avulsive events do not do so.435
The Patterson dissent's "one size fits all" rationale implies a more
draconian result if the situation were reversed. Justice Medina would "roll"
the easement waterward onto new beachfront created by accretion or
avulsion.436 The dissent favors lateral public access over private right to
exclude in any boundary change along the Gulf.437
430. Id. at *14-*15.
431. Id. (internal citation omitted).
432. Id. at *12 (citing Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987)).
433. Id. at *15 (Medina, J., dissenting).
434. Id.
435. Id. at *11 (majority opinion).
436. Id.at*17.
437. Id. at *19.
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VI. STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT' S IMPACT ON CUSTOMARY
RIGHT OF USE AND ROLLING EASEMENTS IN FLORIDA
The Supreme Court in Stop the Beach Renourishment showed great
deference to the Florida Supreme Court's holdings regarding public trust
and property rights. Indeed, to the extent the Supreme Court held that
Martin v. Busch,438 a case never even cited, let alone addressed by the state
court, supported the decision in Walton Beach, the Supreme Court
seemingly applied the "tipsy coachman" rule. 439 This is especially
significant, insofar as the Court had to hold the state action was grounded in
a fundamental background principle of state law to uphold it against the
takings claim.440 In effect, the Stop the Beach Renourishment Court held
that a Florida decision that the Florida Supreme Court never mentioned
constituted the background principle of state law supporting the decision on
review. Regardless, one wonders what the Supreme Court's deference
means as to other public use of the beaches in Florida. Particularly, what
does the decision portend for the public's rights to use the beaches by
customary right?
The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal, in Trepanier v. County of
Volusia, noted, correctly, that these issues must ultimately be resolved by
the Florida Supreme Court.44' It is the exact set of issues that various Texas
state and federal courts have not resolved conclusively regarding that state's
Open Beaches Act. To wit, do public customary rights in a beach move
landward as a beach disappears physically? If so, under what
circumstances? Implicitly, the final question is, if it does, is the affected
property owner due compensation? In a real sense, this is the opposite of
Stop the Beach Renourishment. What are the respective public and private
rights where no renourishment occurs?
The Trepanier court noted that Florida Constitution article X, section
11, confirms the State's public trust ownership of submerged sovereign
lands lying below the mean high water line of the beaches of the Gulf of
438. Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274, 274 (Fla. 1972).
439. The "tipsy coachman" standard originated in Lee v. Porter, 63 Ga. 345, 346 (Ga. 1879),
where the Georgia Supreme Court quoted Oliver Goldsmith Retaliation (1774): "The coachman was
tipsy, the chariot drove home; would you ask for his merits, alas! He had none; what was good was
spontaneous, his faults were his own." That is, the lower court reached the right result for the wrong
reason, and will be upheld.
440. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't Envtl. Prot., 177 L. Ed. 2d 184, 207
(2010).
441. Trepanier v. Cnty. of Volusia, 965 So.2d 276, 293 n.21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
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Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean.442 As we have discussed, lands lying above
the mean high water line are subject to private ownership. Just as in Texas,
the typical ways that the public in Florida obtains an easement to use the
"dry beach" are via prescriptive easement, dedication, whether express or
implied, coupled with acceptance, or customary use.4 43 The specific issue in
contention in Trepanier was the right to drive on the beach where it eroded
after tropical storms and hurricanes in 1999 and 2004.444
The court took little time in finding no prescriptive easement. Florida
law establishes a prescriptive easement where a use is open, continuous,
notorious, and adverse over twenty years.445 Most prescriptive easement
claims fail because there is a strong presumption that use is permissive. 446
Few claimants are therefore able to meet the high burden of establishing
adverse use. The Trepanier court found the prescriptive claim failed to
show it was adverse or continuous. The court noted:
Appellant's affidavit stated that, before 1999, extensive
dunes covered their property seaward of the seawall line
and where the County now allows driving. From the
record, it is disputed-indeed it appears unlikely-that the
public was continuously driving on the part of the beach at
issue prior to 1999, or that the public's use was adverse. 447
The court also discounted the argument that the property owners'
predecessor had dedicated the parcel to public use. The Court quoted the
plat of the subject development, which stated in pertinent part: "The
Coronado Beach Land Company ... hereby dedicates the boulevards,
avenues, streets, roads, and drives to the public use."448 The plat did "not
provide the 'clear and unequivocal' proof that the dedicator intended to
dedicate" the "dry beach" portion of the platted parcel.4 49
Finally, the Trepanier court rejected the right to a "rolling easement" by
custom based on the record before it.450 The court remanded to flesh out the
issue. It cited the Florida Supreme Court's decision in City of Daytona
Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., where the majority of the court held that public
442. Id. at 284.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 278.
445. Downing v. Bird, 100 So.2d 57, 64-65 (Fla. 1958).
446. Id.
447. Trepanier, 965 So.2d at 284-85.
448. Id. at 286.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 293.
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beach rights may be established by custom.45' The Florida Supreme Court
in Tona-Rama found that no easement was established by prescription, but
one was established by custom on the facts of that case.452 The Tona-Rama
court held the standard is:
[T]he recreational use of the sandy area ... has been
ancient, reasonable, without interruption, and free from
453dispute ....
As applied to the facts, the Tona-Rama majority stated:
This right of customary use of the dry sand area of the
beaches by the public does not create any interest in the
land itself. Although this right of use cannot be revoked by
the land owner, it is subject to appropriate governmental
regulation and may be abandoned by the public. The rights
of the owner of the dry sand may be compared to rights of
a part-owner of a land-locked nonnavigable lake, as
described in Duval v. Thomas, 114 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1959).
Testimony was presented that the public's presence on the
land and its use of the land was not adverse to the interest
of the [property owner], but rather that the [owner's] Main
Street pier relied on the presence of such seekers of the sea
for its business. Thus, the issue of adversity was clearly
raised and the evidence failed to show any adverse use by
the public.... The general public may continue to use the
dry sand area for their [sic] usual recreational activities, not
because the public has any interest in the land itself, but
because of a right gained through custom to use this
particular area of the beach as they have without dispute
and without interruption for many years.454
Trepanier held that Tona-Rama is unclear as to whether right by custom
is limited to the area where use was established, or to the entire beach.4 55
The court held that the context of Tona-Rama, buttressed by Oregon
authority, is best read to establish public use by custom solely in the area




455. Trepanier, 965 So.2d at 287.
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that was used, versus the entire beach.456 A clear reading of the majority
opinion in Tona-Rama, however, shows that the court limited the customary
right to "use this particular area of the beach." 457 Accordingly, one need not
infer that the Florida Supreme Court so limited the use by custom.
Interestingly, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice O'Connor, dissented from
the United States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari of a decision that
rested on the first Oregon decision, which could be read to establish a
public right to custom along the entire Pacific coast of Oregon.458 Justice
Scalia stated that custom was limited to specific individuals in a particular
location. 459
The Trepanier court summed up the law of custom as: "[A] certain
thing has been done in a certain way in a certain place for so long that no
one can remember when it wasn't done that way. . . ."46 0 The Trepanier
court cited Scalia's dissent in Stevens in stating: "[I]t appears to us that the
acquisition of a right to use private property by custom is intensely local
and anything but theoretical." 4 6 ' The court concluded that remand was
necessary to establish if beach driving was thus customary in "this" stretch
of beach. 462
The Court discussed at length whether any customary use could be
subject to a rolling easement. First, it noted that the record on summary
judgment, read in the light most favorable to the property owners, showed
that avulsion, and not erosion, caused the loss of sandy beach in the area. If
so, boundaries would not change. 463
The Trepanier court noted the Texas decision in Matcha,4 64 where that
court held the easement moved over time. Nonetheless, Trepanier stated the
Texas Court appeared to make a policy, rather than evidentiary, decision.4 65
The court remanded to determine whether "the public has a customary right
to drive and park on Appellants' property as an adjunct of its right to other
456. Id. at 288.
457. Tona-Rama, 294 So.2d at 78 (emphasis added).
458. State v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671, 673 (Or. 1969).
459. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 1332, 1335 n.5 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
460. Trepanier, 965 So.2d at 289.
461. Id. at 289.
462. Id. at 285.
463. Id. at 292-93.
464. Matcha v. Mattox, 711 S.W2d 95, 100 (Tex. 1986) (holding that "the public easement also
shifts with the natural movements of the beach").
465. Trepanier, 965 So.2d at 293.
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recreational uses of that property."466 The question of whether an easement
established by custom may move landward remains open in Florida.
The question is much more problematic on a renourished beach. Under
section 161.211(2), the "provisions of section 161.191(2) shall cease to be
operative as to the affected upland" if the agency charged with maintaining
the beach fails to do so and "as a result thereof the shoreline gradually
recedes to a point or points landward of the erosion control line."4 67 Under
this provision, erosion landward of the ECL continues to decrease the
upland owner's property. However, the ECL is not voided by this provision,
nor is the "vesting of title" under section 161.191(1) undone. Therefore, if
the shoreline then accretes back to the ECL, any further accretions still
belong to the state. This provision does not protect the upland owner at all.
Instead, it protects the agency from legal responsibility to the upland owner
for preventing further erosion.
In a classic case of unintended consequences, the statute would, under
these circumstances, divest the public from the right to use the wet sand
beaches. Under the statute, the entire area landward of the ECL remains
vested in the upland property owner, which would include areas of wet sand
if the beach erodes landward of the ECL. While the statute "creates" public
easement by custom of waterward of the ECL, the State Brief in Stop the
Beach Renourishment interprets Chapter 161 in a manner that would
preclude a "rolling easement" to establish public use per se as a beach
erodes upland of the ECL.4 68 Given the varieties of erosion, and the odds
that what eroded before will erode again, this is not a merely intellectual
exercise. Rather, it is a prediction.
Otherwise, nothing in section 161.211 provides meaningful protection
to the rights of the upland land owner. The statute does not "balance the
interests" of the landowner and the state and return the landowner to the
"status quo ante" if the state fails to live up to its end of the balance.
Instead, the statute locks in the landowner's loss, provides only illusory
rights or protections, and in fact guarantees that the landowner will be
subjected to at least a temporary taking.
Even if the Act were interpreted as providing legally defensible rights
comparable to traditional riparian rights, the conversion of the ancient
property right to a statutory right leaves the upland property owner with no
meaningful replacement. Quite simply, under current Eleventh Circuit
4 6 6. Id.
467. FLA. STAT. § 161.211(2) (2010).
468. Brief of Respondents at 10-11, Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Envtl.
Prot., 177 L. Ed. 2d 184 (2010) (No. 08-1151).
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decisions, statutorily created rights are given no inherent constitutional
regard and can be totally abrogated by later legislative acts, limited solely
by minimal due process requirements. 4 69 Nor are statutory rights protected
by the takings clause absent some particular vesting under individual facts.
Mere "statutory rights" are not protected under Eleventh Circuit
precedent from arbitrary and capricious deprivation by executive actors.4 70
Furthermore, statutory rights are no longer protected fully by procedural
due process guarantees under the Fourteenth Amendment: under current
doctrine in the Eleventh Circuit, the procedural due process protections for
a "statutorily created right" are limited to those found in the statute or
common law.47 ' Here, the Act gives no protections to the landowner to
vindicate the "statutory rights," so the landowner would not be entitled to
any federal due process protection against any action that deprived the
landowner of those rights.
This means that the Legislature could simply rescind the statutorily
provided "common law riparian rights" for any reason, without being
subject to damages under either substantive due process or as a taking.
Therefore, one must question footnote 12 of Justice Scalia's opinion for the
Stop the Beach Renourishment Court, in which he concluded: "[W]hether
the source of a property right is the common law or a statute makes no
difference, so long as the property owner continues to have what he
previously had." 472  The property owners lost both substantive and
469. See, e.g., Greenbriar Village, LLC v. Mountain Brook, 345 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir.
2003) (noting that the city could amend zoning ordinance to extinguish rights in permits, limited solely
by the "rational basis" test); McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1110 (1995) ("[S]tate law based rights constitutionally may be rescinded so long the elements of
procedural-not substantive-due process are observed.").
470. See McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1556 (discussing that only the Constitution creates substantive
due process rights); City of Pompano Beach v. Yardarm Rest., Inc., 834 So.2d 861, 869 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2002) (citing McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1556) (explaining that substantive due process protects against
arbitrary legislative action, not arbitrary executive action); Paedae v. Escambia Cnty., 709 So.2d 575,
577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (citing McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1556) (stating "a right which merits
substantive due process protection is protected against government actions regardless of the procedures
used to implement them"); see, e.g., Ammons v. Okeechobee Cnty., 710 So.2d 641, 645 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1998) ("Where a state-based right is revoked, it may be constitutionally rescinded where
procedural due process is observed." (citing McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1556)).
471. See DeKalb Stone Inc. v. DeKalb Cnty., 106 F.3d 956, 959-60 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding
plaintiffs did not allege a deprivation of Constitutional rights); Boatman v. Town of Oakland, 76 F.3d
341, 346 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding plaintiffs were not entitled to any procedural due process protection
against illegal deprivation of permit other than to repair to state court); McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1556,
1561, 1565 (discussing that rights based on state law can be revoked provided procedural due process is
followed).
472. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't Envtl. Prot., 177 L. Ed. 2d 184, 208
(2010).
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procedural rights by the purported codification of the rights they enjoyed
under the United States and Florida Constitutions and at common law.
The "Brief of the Respondents, Florida Department of Environmental
Protection & Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund"
(the "State Brief') in Stop the Beach Renourishment, stakes a position that
undermines any public claim of a "rolling easement" landward of the
ECL.473 The State Brief provided that section 161.141 of the Florida
Statutes "requires that the [State] follow the existing, pre-project MHWL in
setting the ECL, unless engineering or other requirements dictate
otherwise." 474 The brief emphasized section 161.161(5), which states in
pertinent part that the State shall set the ECL in a manner that reflects "the
need to protect existing ownership of as much upland as is reasonably
possible." 475
The State Brief lists ten ways chapter 161 protects upland owners.4 76
Particularly, the brief states the statute does not "change[ ] the rights of
private upland owners to their pre-existing parcel of land; none is
physically taken; none is subject to different or inconsistent uses." 477
Footnote fifteen quotes section 161.141, in stating the State does not intend
to "'extend its claims to lands not already held by it or to deprive any
upland or submerged land owner of the legitimate and constitutional use
and enjoyment of his or her property."' 478 The State Brief quotes the section
further in noting that "additions to upland property" are "'subject to a
public easement for traditional uses of the sandy beach consistent with uses
that would have been allowed prior to the need for the restoration
project."' 4 79 Presumptively, then, the public easement does not extend to the
uplands themselves, nor should it be allowed to "roll" per se after erosion
landward of the ECL.
Stop the Beach Renourishment terminated substantial property rights
under the United States and Florida Constitutions and common law. It
probably left in place statutes that illegally amended the sovereign
boundaries along beach shores established in Florida common law as
codified in article X, section 11, of the Florida Constitution. That appears to
be an issue, albeit core, for another day. It left two arguably beneficial
473. Brief of Respondents at 10-11, Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. v. Fla. Dep't Envtl.
Prot., 177 L. Ed. 2d 184 (2010) (No. 08-1151).
474. Id. at 7-8,8 n.10.
475. Id. at 8 n.10.
476. Id. at 9-16.
477. Id. at10-11.
478. Id. at 11 n.15.
479. Id. at 11 n.15 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 161.141) (emphasis added).
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results for private upland owners along the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of
Mexico. First, it gave government sufficient security in public access
created under chapter 161 to continue beach renourishment, funds allowing.
Second, the State Brief interprets chapter 161 in a manner that indicates the
statutorily created public easement waterward of the ECL will not become a
"rolling" easement once beaches erode landward of the ECL. Perhaps Stop
the Beach Renourishment will ultimately be a pyrrhic victory.

